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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly apply the law, and improperly created new

law, when it concluded Mrs. Bradford's conveyance of her undivided one half interest in
real property to her son Mr. DeMita was afraudulentconveyance because of "threats of
divorce" by Mr. Bradford, even after the Court of Appeals determined Mr. Bradford's
creditor claim (of inheritance) to Mrs. Bradford's undivided one half interest was not
valid, and Mrs. Bradford retained her undivided one half interest in the property.
OPINION ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and ruling on December 16, 1999. Case
number 981745-CA. 1999 UTApp 373.
JURISDICTION
The date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed is December 16, 1999.
Order granting an extension of time to petition for certiorari was January 20,2000.
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Title VII Rule 45
& 46 (a)(2,3, &4).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.
With respect to the issue of fraudulent conveyance, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, as set forth in Section 25-6-1 et seq., of the Utah Code Annotated is determinative. A
copy of said Act is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case came before the Fourth District Court on a Complaint for Divorce and Claim
for fraudulent conveyance. The matter was tried to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen on
March 4,1998, and Findings of Fact and a Decree of Divorce were entered on July 14,1998.
Thereafter, defendants filed a timely Motion to Alter and Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree and the Court denied said Motion September 4,1998. The
case was then timely appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and a written ruling was entered
into on December 16, 1999. Then this writ of certiorari followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo,

Utah, and have been husband and wife since that date. (Findings of Fact No. 1, page 152,
Record.)
2.

Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage

for both parties. (Findings of Fact No. 4, page 152, Record.)
3.

No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult children from

prior marriages. (Findings of Fact No. 5, page 151, Record.)
4.

Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old.

(Findings of Fact No. 6, page 151, Record.)
5.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are at a point in their life where they

could be retrained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income.
(Findings of Fact No. 12, page 151, Record.)
2

6.

Mr. Bradford intended to give Mrs. Bradford one-half of the marital

residence property when he deeded her a joint tenancy interest in it and did so because he
was happy with her, wanted to care for her, and loved her. (Record page 190, Trial transcript
at page 56, line 11 through 13 and 25, and page 57, line 1 through 12.)
7.

Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he

and Mrs. Bradford as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in
common" approximately four years after they had married. (Findings of Fact No. 18, page
150, Record.)
8.

In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford. At that

time, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him. This
divorce action was dismissed in 1993. (Findings of Fact No. 19, page 150, Record.)
9.

Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments

and Mr. Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions. (Findings of
Fact No. 20, page 150, Record.)
10.

On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-Claim Deed deeded

her share of the home to her son, James DeMita. Mr. DeMita gave his mother $ 10.00 for the
deed. (Findings of Fact No. 24, page 149, Record.)
11.

When Mrs. Bradford deeded her half of the property to Mr. DeMita, she

did so because she was concerned that if she predeceased him, her children would not get
any of her interest in the property and she was not concerned at the time about Mr. Bradford

3

divorcing her, because of his repeated threats over the years. (Record page 190, Trial
transcript at page 30, line 16 through 24.)
12.

Mrs. Bradford owed nothing to Mr. Bradford and was not indebted to

him before or after she quit claimed the subject property to her son. (Record page 190, Trial
Transcript at page 78, lines 2 through 7.)
13.

After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. DeMita continued to live in

the home as they had before. (Findings of Fact No. 29, page 149, Record.)
14.

The time between the granting of the Quit-Claim Deed in August of

1996 and the filing of divorce was approximately eleven months. (Findings of Fact No. 31,
page 148, Record.)

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A person asserting afraudulentconveyance must be a creditor of the

person claimed to havefraudulentlyconveyed the property. A person asserting fraudulent
conveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the claim is valid. The Court
of Appeals ruled against Mr. Bradford's "clainT of inheritance to the property and Mrs.
Bradford retained her undivided one half interest in the property, then the Court improperly
created its own new classification of creditor, "threats of divorce" under the Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. The Court of Appeals admits in its opinion there is no Utah case law to
support its new classification of "threats of divorce," therefore, the Court is improperly
creating new law, and misapplying existing law, by stating "threats of divorce" create a
creditor claim under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Consequently, the threshold element a
legitimate claim proven by clear and convincing evidence, of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
fails.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the threshold question to be
answered in a fraudulent conveyance case is whether a party claiming a fraudulent
conveyance is a creditor of the party who has allegedlyfraudulentlytransferred property. It
has stated that a creditor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that claimant is a
creditor. Territorial Savings & Loan v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452,458 (Utah 1989), Furniture v.
Deamen 680 P.2d 398,399 (Utah 1984), and Meyer v. General Amer. Corp., 569 P.2d 1094,
1096 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court in Clark v. Rossow, 657 P.2d 903,
5

904 (Az. 1982) stated that the Fraudulent Conveyance Act does not itself create a new claim.
If a claim does not exist outside of the Act, there is no remedy. Utah's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act only refers to debtors and creditors and specifically states at Section 25-6-5,
U.C.A. under the caption "Fraudulent Transfer" "(1) a transfer made or obligation incurred
by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, . . . " A non-creditor of a person transferring
property cannot assert a claim under the Fraudulent Transfer Act to set aside the conveyance
of property by a party who is not his debtor.
In the present case, husband deeded property that was the marital residence and that
husband owned separately prior to the marriage to himself and wife in joint tenancy
approximately eight years prior to commencement of the divorce proceedings. Husband's
testimony at trial admits that wife owed him nothing and that she was not indebted to him
before or after she gave her son the Quit Claim Deed to her undivided one-half interest in the
property.
If the Fraudulent Conveyance Act by itself does not make husband the creditor of wife
and if husband admits that wife never owed him any money, then husband's only basis for
being a creditor under the Fraudulent Transfer Act is that he wants the one-half of the
property that he deeded to his wife back.
The Court of Appeals ruled Mr. Bradford's claim arose out of "threats of divorce"
during the marriage (Note: Mr. Bradford's claim is the property was inherited, so he should
be able to get it back, and that was his "creditor claim," the Court of Appeals created a
different claim, "threats of divorce," then Mr. Bradford was even asserting.) The Court of
6

Appeals admits in %l 5 of its opinion there is no Utah case law to support its ruling. Bradford
v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373. The Court in ^[15 of the opinion cites to a 1975 Oregon
Supreme Court ruling to support its analysis. Adamson v. Adamson. 541 p.2d 460 (Or. 1975).
Although the Oregon case is not precedent for Utah law, a brief analysis of the case is in
order since the Court included it in its analysis.
Adamson involved a husband and wife owning a half interest jointly as tenants by the
entirety along with Husband's Mother; husband and his father Coerced and duressed wife
into conveying joint title to husband's father. 541 p.2d460(Or. 1975). Husband and wife
were living separately, wife was sick with her pregnancy, wife had confidential relationship
with father in law and trusted him completely, wife was threatened, harassed, did not know
what she was signing, husband had been unemployed and having financial difficulties, and
this was husband's only tangible asset in which to pay any child support. 541 p.2d 460,464465 (Or. 1975). The Oregon Court found for wife to set aside the conveyancefromher and
her husband to her father in law. id. 466.
In the Adamson case, the creditor relationship, in so many words, was husband's child
support obligation and his lack of means in which to pay it, not "threats of divorce", id. In
our case, Mr. And Mrs. Bradford had no children together, and no claims by either party of
child support were made, therefore, the Adamson case is not comparable to this case before
this court, id.
If the Court of Appeals ruling were to stand, it will set a whole new category in the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, namely, a creditor must prove by clear and convincing
7

evidence he or she is a creditor, unless they are husband and wife and one party threatens
divorce during the marriage, id.
This would be against good public policy as well; This would treat married
individuals property rights different from non-married individuals property rights; Title
companies, grantees, and others, would have to ensure there were no 'threats of divorce"
leavedfromeither married grantor before receiving propertyfromone of them; This leaves a
greater potential of abuse from married grantors; if a grantor changed their mind about a
conveyance, the non grantor spouse could claim there were "threats of divorce," and petition
to rescind the conveyance as fraudulent. This could severely restrict the alienability of
property.
Mrs. Bradford owned a one-half interest in joint tenancy in the marital residence and
had a right to use it as she desired, indeed, the Court of Appeals ruled she has an undivided
one-half interest. There is numerous Jurisprudence that supports Mrs. Bradford's right to use
it separately how she desires [ "The transfer of once separate property into joint names of
both spouses is deemed a gift." (41 C.J.S. Section 103). "An interspousal gift operates as a
transfer to the donee spouse of a separate property interest." (41 C.J.S. Section 102). "A gift
from a husband to his wife confers on the wife good title..., and is not impliably limited to
the duration of the marriage." (41 C.J.S. Section 102). "A giftfroma wife to her husband is
binding as a transaction between other persons . . . . The husband cannot be compelled to
return the money or property given nor can the wife reclaim or recover it." (41 C.J.S. Section
102)]. Mrs. Bradford was concerned if she predeceased Mr. Bradford, her children would
8

not get any of her interest in the property, so she conveyed her interest to her son. Nothing
placed into evidence by husband created a basis for a claim against wife to meet the threshold
requirements of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, nor has the Court of Appeals shown
anything to satisfy the "clear and convincing" requirement under the act. id.
Definitive evidence that Mr. Bradford had no valid creditor claim against Mrs.
Bradford is the fact that Mrs. Bradford retains her undivided one half interest in the property.
The Court did not award Mr. Bradford, on any claim, or any portion of Mrs. Bradford's
undivided one half interest, id. If Mr. Bradford is a valid creditor of Mrs. Bradford, then that
amount Mrs. Bradford was indebted to him would have been taken out of her undivided one
half interest. This was not done, because Mrs. Bradford owes nothing to Mr. Bradford, and
Mr. Bradford has no legitimate claim.
Therefore, the court's determination that conveyance of this property to her son was
fraudulent should be reversed and the court should declare that husband and appellant, Mr.
DeMita, each own a one-half interest in said property in common.
CONCLUSION
There was no evidence or legal precedent to support finding that Mr. Bradford was
Mrs. Bradford's creditor and, therefore, afraudulentconveyance fails. Appellant prays that
this Court reverse the Court of Appeal's ruling with respect to thefraudulentconveyance and
declare that Mr. Bradford and appellant, Mr. DeMita, each own a one-half interest in said
property in common.
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DATED February 14,2000.

mes DeMittfTAppellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, this \£ day of February, 2000, to the following:
Thomas R. Patton
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Appellee
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box AL@
Provo, UT 84603-0200 ^
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CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.
25-6-12.
25-6-13.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or
after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before
transfer.
Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief— Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Construction of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act."

25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate* means:

1988

25-6-2

(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power
to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the
debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business
under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtors assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not
include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a
valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt
under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not
the right is reduced to judgment, Hquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general
partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(aXii);
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a
director, officer, or person in control; or
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv);
(vi) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager; or
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director,
officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
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(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is
a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7XcXiii);
(v) a limited liability company of which the
debtor is a member or manager; or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor,
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company:
(i) a member or manager of the debtor,
(ii) another limited liability company in which
the debtor is a member or manager;
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a
general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7XdXiii);
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member,
manager, or person in control of the debtor;
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the
affiliate were the debtor; and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an
obligation, and includes a security interest created by
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory
lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, association, organization,
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial
entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the
third degree as determined by the common law, or a
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) Transfer* means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and
creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against
the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal
or equitable process or proceedings.
1992

25-6-3. Insolvency.
( D A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent.
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate,
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership
debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to
the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor
not included as an asset.
1988

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred

1102

or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value
does not include an unperformed promise made other than in
the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish
support to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) and Section 25-6-6, a
person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person
acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a
regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the
interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of
trust, or security agreement
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange
between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to
be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.
1988
25-6-5.

F r a u d u l e n t transfer — Claim a r i s i n g before or

• after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the -transfer or obligation; and the debtor
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a busi, ness or a transaction for which the remaining assets
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to
the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed that he would incur, debts
beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) Tb determine "actual intent" under Subsection (lXa),
consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider,
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with
suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's
assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after
a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.
1888
25-6-6.

F r a u d u l e n t transfer — Claim arising before

transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

1103
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the
transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the
debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent
its*
25-6-7. Transfer — When made,
In this chapter:
(1) A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property
other than a fixture, but including the interest of a
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the
asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a
good-faiiii purchaser of the asset from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits the transfer to
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far
perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire a judicial lien other than under this chapter
' that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in Subsection (1) and the transfer is not
so perfected before the commencement of an action for
relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made
immediately before the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be
perfected as provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and
the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the
parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing
executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the
benefit of the obligee.
1968
25-6-8. R e m e d i e s of c r e d i t o r s .
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation
under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in
Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against
the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in
accordance wiith applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an iigunction against further disposition by the
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the
asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against
the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution
on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
1968
25-6-9. Good f a i t h transfer.
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection
25-6-5(1 Xa) against a person who took in good faith and for a
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.

25-6-12

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the
extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under
Subsection 25-6-8(1 Xa), the creditor may recover judgment for
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered
against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for
whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent
transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the
value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an
amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the
transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is
entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the
transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset
transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the
judgment
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb)
or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor
when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance
with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the
benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless
the new value was secured by a valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider, or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured present value
given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the
debtor.
itss
25-6-10. Claim for relief — T i m e limits.
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent
transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished
unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Xa), within four years
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or
obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant;
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) or 25-6-6(1), within
four years after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred; or (3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
1968

25-6-11. Legal p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o chapter.
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and
equity, including merchant law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement
this chapter's provisions.
1988
25-6-12. C o n s t r u c t i o n of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
1988
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Defendant.

13
14
15

The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4, 1998. The Plaintiff was
present and represented by counsel, Thomas R. Patton. Defendants were also present and represented
by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently

16
advised in the premises now makes the following:
17
FINDINGS OF FACT
18
1. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford were married in June of 1985 in Provo, Utah and have been
19
husband and wife since that date.
20
2. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford are and have been residents of Utah County, Utah for at least
21
three months prior to the commencement of this action.
22
3. There have arisen irreconcilable differences between Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford thai
23

make the continuation of this marriage no longer viable.

24
4. Both parties have been married before, making this a second marriage for both parties.
25

1

5. No children were born of this marriage, but each had adult childrenfromprior marriages.

2

6. Mr. Bradford is 63 years old and Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old.

3

7. At the time of the parties' marriage, Mrs. Bradford had limited assets other than her personal

4 property and some property in Indianola which eventually sold for $5000.00. However, Mr. Bradford
5 gave Mrs. Bradford the funds whose returns were eventually used to pay oflf the debt on the Indianola
6 land. Mrs. Bradford kept the returns on the sale of the Indianola land for herself.
7

8. Mr. Bradford worked at Geneva Steel before the parties married and subsequently obtained

8 other training and is now a janitor with Nebo School District.
9

9. Mr. Bradford receives $410.00fromhis current employment at Nebo School District, $769.00

10 from Social Security, and $324.00 from his pension and $50.00 rent from the property for a total of
11 $1553.00 net per month. The Court notes that Mr. Bradford pays approximately $105.00 per month into
12 a retirement account at the school district. Since that payment is discretionary, the Court will add this
13 to his net income for a total of $1658.00.
14

10. Mrs. Bradford has worked at temporary jobs, but has not worked for many years as she

15 claims that she has carpal tunnel syndrome and has difficulty focusing on her task.
16

11. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150.00 for child care of her grandchild, and $381.00

17 in Social Security for a total of $531.00 per month.
18

12. The Court finds that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford are in a point in their life where they

19 could be retained or develop new skills for purposes of substantially increasing their income.
20

13. Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have lived in the home in Spanish Fork, Utah since the

21 marriage. This home was paid for and given to Mr. Bradford as part of his inheritance before the
22 marriage. Mr. Bradford was born and raised in this house. This house has been owned by Mr.
23 Bradford's family for many generations and has been passed down within the familyfromgeneration to

24 I
25

->

1

generation.

2

14. The Courtfindsthat since the marriage of the parties that there have been improvements to

3

the house in that the roof was repaired, a furnace was added, and the septic system had been repaired and

4

the home was hooked up to city water.

5

15. Although Mrs. Bradford claims to have been an integral part of the improvements, the Court

6

finds that she merely made phone calls and arrangements to have the work completed. Any other

7

projects, such as painting, which she did were not improvements but along the lines of general repair and

8

maintenance of the home.

9

16. The repairs and improvements were paid for through funds which Mr. Bradford received

10 from a settlement with Geneva Steel. These funds were accumulated prior to the marriage.
11

17. It is undisputed that the house is worth approximately $180,000.00.

12

18. Mr. Bradford deeded by way of warranty deed the property back to he and Mrs. Bradford

13

as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common" approximately four years

14

after they had married.

15

19. In 1992, Mr. Bradford filed for divorce form Mrs. Bradford. At that time, Mr. Bradford

16

requested that the home and real property be awarded to him. This divorce action was dismissed in 1993.

17

20. Since 1992, Mr. Bradford and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments and Mr. Bradford

18

has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions.

19

21. James Demita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been living with Mr. Bradford and Mrs.

20

Bradford since 1995. Mr. Demita's minor son also stays at the home from time to time. Mr. Demita

21

stays rent free, although he is supposed to be pay the utilities.

22

22. Mr. Demita went to one year of law school and has since worked odd jobs. At the time of

23

the trial, Mr. Demita was working part-time at a computer store. His 1996 gross income was only

24
25

7

1

approximately $3500.00.

2

23. In 1996, the parties began to jointly develop land for rezoning, division into lots and sale.

3

They hired LSI Inc. to survey the ground, prepare a subdivision plat and perform other pre-sales work.

4

Mr. Demita was to receive 25% of the profits form the sale for his assistance in developing the property.

5

24. In July of 1996, Mr. Bradford came home to various engineers at his home. Although the

6

reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the

7

way the development was proceedings. This particular argument was more sever than prior arguments

8

and divorce was discussed.

9
10

25. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford by way of Quit-claim Deed deeded her share of the home
to her son James Demita. Mr. Demita gave his mother $10.00 for the deed.

11

26. The Courtfindsthat $10.00 was not equivalent value of one-half of the house and property.

12

27. The Courtfindsthat the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed was made to an "insider" according

13

to Utah law as Mr. Demita is Mrs. Bradford's son.

14

28. Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer to Mr. Demita was for estate planning purposes.

15

However, she acknowledged that she only deeded the property to him and not her other five children,

16

and that she did not have nor did she prepare a will at that time nor were instructions given regarding the

17

disposition of the property.

18
19
20

29. After the transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita continued to live in the home as they had
before.
30. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr. Bradford of the Quit-claim Deed. Mr.

21 I Bradford subsequently discovered the deed when his daughter went to the County Recorder's Office,
22

Mr. Bradford's daughter went to the recorder's office to verify that the home and property had beer

23

rezoned for development as Mr. Demita had indicated to them. The daughter then discovered the Quit

24
25

A

1

claim Deed and that in actuality the property had not been rezoned.

2

31. Soon after the discovery of this information, Mr. Bradford filed for this divorce action. The

3

time between the granting of the Quit-claim Deed in August of 1996 and the filing of divorce was

4

approximately eleven months.

5

32. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her in possession of only

6

her personal property, which has limited value. Thus, this transfer constituted a transfer of substantially

7

all of her assets.

8

33. When asked on cross examination whether she could afford to pay Mr. Bradford one-half

9

of the value of the property, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she did not have the funds and would have to

10

look to family members to assist her if she were obligated to pay this.

11

34. At the time of the transfer of the Quit-claim Deed, Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably

12

believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the home and

13

property as his before the marriage as he had done so in the divorce action which he filed in 1992.

14

35. The Court finds that the house and property is in fact not partitionable as it contains a

15

residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would have to be

16

refinanced or sold.

17

36. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the new deed to the house, the

18

Courtfindsthat the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford as he inherited thisfromhis father before

19

the marriage. This is consistent with previous Utah Supreme Court Decisions wherein the parties married

20

later in life and one of the parties had brought into the marriage a significant asset which they later deeded

21

to the other spouse and subsequendy were divorced. See Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utat

22

1981); Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

23

37. Mr. Bradford earns $1926.00 per month. He nets approximately $1658. His financia

24
25

«

1

declaration indicates that his monthly expenses are $1000.00 per month without rent or a mortgage

2

payment. The Courtfindsthat these expenses are reasonable and necessary.

3

38. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month after necessary expenses. Mr. Bradford

4

would also have at his disposal the house and property which do not currently have a mortgage and are

5

worth approximately $180,000.00.

6

39. Mrs. Bradford nets $531.00 per month. She listed her expenses at $1750 which includes

7

$600.00 for rent (which she is currently not paying). This leaves Mrs. Bradford with a shortfall of

8

approximately $1200.00 per month. Mrs. Bradford is 65 years old, not trained in an employable skill, and

9

has health concerns. She gives part-time child care to her grandson for which she is paid $150.00 per

10

month. Although she may be able to earn morefromchild care, there was insufficient evidence that she

11

would be able to find such a position or that even if she were to increase her child care hours that it

12

would meet her shortfall. Thus, the Courtfindsthat Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony.

13

40. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income and cannot make up the shortfall. Mr.

14 Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month in income which exceeds his expenses. Therefore, Mr.
15

Bradford shall pay Mrs. Bradford $600.00 per month in alimony for a term not exceeding the length of

16 the marriage. This would give $1131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses and leave $1058.00 for
17
18

Mr. Bradford's expenses.
41. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have acquired the following personal property during the marriage

19

which property had value at the time of the trial as follows:

20

First Security Bank Accounts:

$6492.00

21

ValicIRA

$2418.00

22

Utah Retirement

$1583.00

23

Insurance Policy Cash Value

$3990.00

24
25

*

I
II

11

42. The Court finds that each party should be awarded one-half of the total sum of the above

2

personal property. The remainder of the personal property has been divided between the parties and the

3

same should be awarded as divided.

4

Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters it:

5
6
7

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3-4(1).

8

2. The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences.

9

3. The Court concludes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 that Mr. Bradford

10

is a creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to

11

her son, Mr. Demita.

12
13
14
15

4. The Court concludes that this transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to
an insider pursuant to § 25-6-2(7) of the Utah Code.
5. The Court concludes that this transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3
of the Utah Code, as her debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made.

16

6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5, the Court concludes that the transfer

17

by Mrs. Bradford to her son Mr. Demita was a fraudulent transfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs.

18

Bradford only received $10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed

19

or reasonably should have believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were

20

divorcedfromMr. Bradford. The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in

21

§ 25-5-6(2) and notes that the transfer was concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to

22

live in the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks

23

before the transfer, and the transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that

24
25

7

1 she had.
2
3

7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the
transfer was a fraudulent conveyance.

4

8. The Court concludes that the property and the house are Mr. Bradford's as he inherited them

5

before the marriage, the parties married later in life for twelve years with no children of issue of the

6

marriage and that Mrs. Bradford brought minimal assets into the marriage and contributed little financially

7

to the improvements on the house.

8

9. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she

9

cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal

10

after expenses, the Court concludes that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford

11

which payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage.

12
13
14
15
16

10. The Court concludes that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed in Finding
number 41.
11. Each party has requested attorneys' fees; however, neither party has submitted testimony
regarding that issue. Therefore,/each party shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this' /'/

17

day

7l998.
BY THE COURT:

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Approve^ as to F
~~»rj?>'*'
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this yO
foregoing to the following:

day of June, 1998, a copy of the

3::

4I
51|

Howard Chuntz
Attorney at Law
1149 West Center Street
Orem,UT 84057

^r
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6
7
8
9
10
11

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
TO HOWARD CHUNTZ, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above and
foregoing Order to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days
from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that

12
time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
13
14
15

DATED this 3<9 day of June, 1998.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

16
17 ||
18"
19
20
21
22
23
24;
25|

THOMAS R P ATTON'
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7

GEORGE R BRADFORD,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

8

Plaintiff,
9

vs.
Civil No. 974401237

10

ANDREA O. BRADFORD and JAMES A.
11 DEMITA,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

12
13

The above entitled matter came before the Court for trial on March 4,1998. The Plaintiff was
14

present and represented by counsel, Thomas R Patton. Defendants were also present and represented
15

by counsel, Howard Chuntz. The Court having heard testimony and evidence and being sufficiently
16

advised in the premises and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
17

enters the following:
18

DECREE OF DIVORCE
19

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code
20

Ann. § 78-3-4(1).
21

2. The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences.
22

3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs.
23

Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita.
24

4. This transfer between Mr. Bradford and Mr. Demita was made to an insider pursuant to § 2525

1
2
3

6-2(7) of the Utah Code.
5. This transfer made Mrs. Bradford insolvent, according to § 25-6-3 of the Utah Code, as her
debts exceeded her income after the transfer was made.

4

6. According to the provisions of Utah Code Ana § 25-6-5, the transfer by Mrs. Bradford to her

5

son Mr. Demita was afraudulenttransfer. The Court looks to the fact that Mrs. Bradford only received

6

$10.00 for the Quit-claim Deed, not an equivalent value, and that she believed or reasonably should have

7

believed that she would incur debts beyond her ability to pay if she were divorced from Mr. Bradford.

8 I The Court also looks to the evidence and applies it to the factors listed in § 25-5-6(2) and notes that the
9

transfer was concealedfromMr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continued to live in the house as before, Mr.

10

Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the

11

transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford believed that she had.

12

7. The Court accordingly sets aside the transfer that Mrs. Bradford made to Mr. Demita as the

13 11 transfer was afraudulentconveyance. Therefore, Mr. Bradford is awarded all right title and interest in
14

the property located at 1100 South Main, Spanish Fork, Utah. The property is more particularly

15

described as:

16 I
17 ||
18 ||
19 ||
20 ||

Parcel No. 2: Beginning at a point which is West 322.35 feet and North 1288.95 feet
from the East quarter corner of Section 25, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 89© 53* 7" West 259.68 feet; thence South 1© 42'
11" West 71.44 feet; thence South 59© 44' 38M West 313.10 feet; thence North 66o 59'
34" West along the North bank of the Spanish Fork River 668.40 feet; thence along said
river bank South 87o 48' 04M West 592.12 feet; thence North 47o 54' 45M West 140.69
feet; thence North 65o 44' 29H East 1150.07 feet; thence South 52o 37 40H East 509.07
feet; thence South 58© 16' 44" East 122.86 feet; thence North 38© 08' 23" East 7.40 feet;
thence South 68© 07 31H East 188.79 feet; thence South 88© 17 42H East 110.24 feet;
thence South 1© 4V 54" West 134.30 feet to the point of beginning.

21
Together with 13 shares in the Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company.
22
23
24
25

8. Since Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony in the amount of nearly $1200.00 which she
cannot substantially reduce, and since Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month at his disposal

1 after expenses, the Court orders that Mr. Bradford pay $600 per month alimony to Mrs. Bradford which
2
3

payment shall not exceed the length of the marriage.
19. The Court orders that the parties shall divide equally the accounts listed below:

4

First Security Bank Accounts:

$6492.00

5

ValicIRA

$2418.00

6

Utah Retirement

$ 1583.00

7

Insurance Policy Cash Value

$3990.00

8

11. The Court orders that^each wtrty shall pay their own costs and attorney's fees

9

DATED this /*f

day ofJu/ie,/?998.
BY THE COURT:

10
11
12

STE^EtfL
DistrictCourt Judge

13
14

Approved as to Form
i

15
***?/'*
16
iOWARD CHUNTZ—'
17
MAILING CERTIFICATE
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this
foregoing to the following:
Howard Chuntz
Attorney at Law
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057

~^\

day of June, 1998, a copy of the

1I

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE

2 TO HOWARD CHUNTZ, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:
3

You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above and

4 foregoing Order to the Honorable Steven L. Hansen for his signature upon the expiration offive(5) days
5 from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprior to that
6 time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
7
8

DATED this *3Q day of June, 1998.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

9
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15
16
17
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20
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^THOMAS
^ f CR.LPATTON
ig^L
Attorney for Plaintiff

ADDENDUM "C"

Howard Chuntz, No. 4208
Attorney for Defendant
1149 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801)222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE R. BRADFORD,
MOTION TO ALTER AND
AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
DECREE

Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREA O. BRADFORD and JAMES A.
DEMITA,

Civil No. 974401237CS
Judge Steven L. Hansen

Defendants.
/

COME NOW defendants in the above captioned matter, by and through their attorney,
Howard Chuntz, and move the Court to alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Findings of Fact at paragraph 18 reflect that Mr. Bradford deeded the property to
he and Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, but do not reflect any statement concerning Mr.
Bradford's intent or the reason for doing so. The Findings of Fact should be amended to include
two additional findings as follows:
a. When Mr. Bradford deeded the property to Mrs. Bradford in joint tenancy, it
was his intent to give her half the property. (See video tape at 2:35:30-48 and 3:09:45-3:10:05).
b. Mr. Bradford gave half of the property to Mrs. Bradford because he wanted
her to have half, because he wanted to take care of her and because he loved her. (See video
tape at 2:36:27-51 and 3:44:20-50).
The Court's Findings of Fact reflect at paragraph 19 that at the time of the 1992 divorce
proceedings, Mr. Bradford requested that the home and real property be awarded to him and that

that action was dismissed in 1993. There should be additional findings of fact to reflect that Mr.
Bradford took no action nor made any demand of Mrs. Bradford for a reconveyance of the
subject property subsequent to the 1992 divorce until filing again in 1997.
The Court should find that at the time Mrs. Bradford quit claimed her interest in the
property to Mr. DeMita, she was not indebted to Mr. Bradford. (See video tape at 3:07:20-30).
There is no evidence to support finding no. 34 that Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably
believed that Mr. Bradford might file a divorce action and that he would probably claim the
home and property as he had done so in the divorce action in 1992.

From the facts and

circumstances adduced at trial and under which the parties lived, Mrs. Bradford could just have
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford had given up any demand for a return of half of the
property that he gave to her. This belief could be reasonably founded on the basis that there had
been no further demand to deliver the property to him during the intervening four to five years,
despite the numerous threats of divorce, and in addition, because the parties continued to deal
with the property as joint owners, particularly with respect to their efforts to develop and sell
lots in the property. In fact, it seems more reasonable that Mrs. Bradford should have expected
that any issue concerning demand for return of the property was long in the past and that she and
Mr. Bradford, in fact, each owned one-half because the parties continued to work together to
develop and sell the property after the "severe argument and discussion of divorce in July of
1996 and the fact that no divorce action took place for a year after that time.
The Court's finding in paragraph 36 thatM. . . the house and property belonged to Mr.
Bradford . . ." is not consistent with the evidence nor case law. Although Mr. Bradford owned
the property prior to the parties' marriage, he chose to give half of it to Mrs. Bradford after they
had been married several years because he cared for her, wanted to take care of her and because
he loved her. He intended to give her the property and it was his intent that she own one-half
of it. This gifting of one-half of the property changed the nature of the property from solely
owned pre-marital property to jointly held marital property as set forth in Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). In that case, the Court ruled that property acquired by
gift or inheritance by one spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce unless the
2

acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence and intent to
make it marital property, (id) That is the very situation in the present case. Mr. Bradford
obtained the property as a gift from his parents, but deeded it in joint tenancy to Mrs. Bradford
with the intent to give her half because he cared for her, loved her, wanted to take care of her
and wanted her to have one-half of the property. The case of Jesperson v. Jesperson cited in
paragraph 36 of the Court's Findings should be distinguished as not applicable to the present case
because in that case the Court found M. . . there was no intention by plaintiff to create a one-half
property interest in defendant, nor any expectation by defendant that he had received a one-half
property interest." (Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). The case of
(Georgedes) cited by the Court in paragraph 36 should also be distinguished. In that case the
Court considered the marriage of fairly short duration whereas in this case the marriage is of
almost thirteen years. In addition, the Court also weighed in connection with the property
settlement the fact that the party receiving the property was also being burdened with all of the
outstanding debts and that any increase in the value of the property was offset by the marital debt
that was being taken on. Finally, Georgedes was decided several years prior to Mortensen v.
Mortensen and makes no mention of the Court's rule in Mortensen regarding the gifted property.
The Court should amend paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law to reflect that Mr.
Bradford was not a creditor of Mrs. Bradford's because Mr. Bradford's claim to the real property
is not based on any legal right and Mrs. Bradford's knowledge of any such claim at the time of
her conveyance to her son would have been purely speculative.
The Court should amend paragraph 6 of its Conclusions of Law to reflect that the
conveyance from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita was not afraudulenttransfer.
The Court should amend paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law so as to remove the same
and not set aside the transfer from Mrs. Bradford to Mr. DeMita as no fraudulent conveyance
occurred.
The Court should amend paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law to be reflective of the
amended Findings of Fact set forth above by defendants.
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In the alternative, if the Court continues to conclude that there was a fraudulent
conveyance, it should conclude that the parties own the real property jointly, that the property
should be sold and the equity divided equally between them as each of them needs the funds
therefrom to maintain a place of abode and that the property cannot be equitably divided without
sale.
Defendant, Andrea Bradford, should be restored to her former name of Andrea DeMita.
Finally, the Court should amend and alter paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Decree of
Divorce to be consistent with the amendments and alterations to the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and to reflect that either Mr. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the
subject real property or that Mrs. Bradford owns a one-half interest in the subject property and
to require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided between Mr. Bradford and whichever
of the defendants the Court deems to own the other half.
The Court has broad discretion in dividing the parties' property at the time of a divorce
regardless of its source or time of acquisition. In the exercise of discretion, trial courts need to
be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property division, which is to allocate the
property in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue
their separate lives. Read v. ReadT 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). The Court's present Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree work an entirely and equitable outcome. The parties
were married more than twelve years and are now into or close to their retirement from gainful
employment. It is inequitable and does not serve the best interest of the parties to go forward
in their lives to deprive Mrs. Bradford of any and all value in the real property that she was
given by Mr. Bradford and which she believes she owned for more than seven years. The facts
of the case, the law applicable to this case, and equity all require that the Court amend and alter
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree as set forth herein and defendants'

4

respectfully pray that the same be done.
DATED this^rnhday of July, 1998.

Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^ ^ S i a y of July, 1998, to the following:
Thomas R. Patton
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
Attorneys for Plaintiff
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84606

div mot
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and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Hansen are appropriate, therefore, denies defendants'
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on March 4, 1998)

3

(Direct examination of Mrs. Bradford by Mr. Patton in

4

progress.

5

Q.

Certain portions extracted)
BY MR. PATTON:

Do you think that those

6

things are worth more than $500 if you added them all

7

together?

8
9
10

A.

I don't know the market value that people

would buy -- what they would pay for it.

I don't know

how much people would pay me for those.

11

Q.

Would it be worth more than a thousand?

12

A.

It would be worth more to me because to

13
14

replace it I would have to pay more.
Q.

Can you tell the Court what you own right

15

now that's worth more than $300, any item of property

16

that you own that is worth more than $3 00?

17

A.

A stereo, stereo console.

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

20

What console?
A stereo console.

old -- I don't know how you say it -- a console.

21

THE COURT:

22

THE WITNESS: Console.

23
24
25

It's an

Q.

For a stereo?

BY MR. PATTON:

your deposition last year?
A.

Yes.

Do you remember when I took

1

Q.

2

that correct?

3

A.

Yes, that's correct.

4

Q.

And you also owned a wooden kitchen table

5

You indicated that you own two dressers; is

and six chairs; is that right?

6

A.

Yes, that's right.

7

Q.

And then you also had personal pictures and

8

family genealogy?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And those items--

11

A.

And a bed.

12

Q.

And a bed.

And that if they were all added

13

together, and you had to sell them at a yard sale or

14

sell them as used furniture, could you get more than a

15

thousand dollars for them?

16

A.

Antiques, like -- I don't know.

17

Q.

You don't know?

18

A.

I don't know what people pay.

19

Q.

Do you remember signing a quit claim deed to

20

Mr. Demita?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And that was for half of the property that

23

Mr. Bradford owned prior to the marriage; is that

24

correct?

25

A.

What I owned --my half what I owned is what

5

I quit claimed.
Q.

You quit claimed to Mr. Demita?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you do that?

A.

When did I do that?

Q.

Yes.

A.

August 8th, 1996.

Q.

I'm going to show you what's been marked

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification and ask
if you recognize that document.

Is that a copy of the

quit claim you signed to Mr. Demita?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And when you are looking at that quit claim

deed, whose handwriting is printed in there word,
"Andrea Bradford, Spanish Fork, James Demita," whose
handwriting is that?
A.

That's James Demita's handwriting.

I asked

him to make up the form for me.
Q.

And then you signed the quit claim deed?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And it was notarized?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was by Lorea Galloway?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And whose office did you go to so that could

6

be notarized?
A.

It wasn't an office, I went to a bank.

Q.

You went to a bank and had it notarized?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Prior to signing that quit claim deed did

you talk to my client about it?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you tell him you were going to do it?

A.

No.

Q.

After you did it did you tell him you had

signed that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You did tell him?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you tell him you had done it?

A.

In order to get the right date it was one of

the only times that Phyllis Penner came into our
kitchen -- so she might remember the date -- and
Phyllis and George were in the kitchen with me, and I
told George and Phyllis both that they didn't need to
worry about their concerns they had about if I died
first that his children wouldn't get any of the
property.

So I told them that I took care of it to

make sure, and I ensured that -- I promised you that
you will get half of the property because I took care

7

of it so that it will be that way.
MR. PATTON:

May I approach the witness,

your Honor?
THE COURT:
MR. PATTON:

You may.
Your Honor, we would submit

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for identification as
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
THE COURT:
evidence.

Okay, you're offering it into

Any objection?
MR. CHUNTZ:

No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Number l will be received.

(Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

When I took your deposition

I asked you if you owed Mr. Demita any money when you
signed that quit claim deed, and in fact you didn't
owe him any money when you signed that, did you?
A.

No.

Q.

And when I asked you why you signed it you

said it was simply estate planning.
signed that deed?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you sign a will?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you go see an attorney?

A.

Yes.

Is that why you

8

Q.

Who did you go see?

A.

Howard Chuntz.

Q.

And you went to his office and met with him

prior to signing the quit claim deed?
A.

I can't remember if it was on the telephone

or in his office, but I remember he told me I had two
options, that I could either -- I wasn't knowledgeable
about how to take care of my -- what I owned in case I
died, and so I asked him what I -- how I should ensure
that my child will get what I have -- what I own when
I die.

He said I have two options, I could either

quit claim it or I could put it in some kind of a
trust -- family fund or something like that, and he
said the second option will cost you money to do that,
and the first -- quit claim won't cost you any money,
and I said, "Well, I'll--" so I decided I wanted to do
it the quit claim way.
Q.

When I took your deposition last year you

indicated that you believed you had talked to him by
phone; isn't that correct?
A.

Say that again.

Q.

Last year when I took your deposition you

believed that you had talked to Mr. Chuntz by phone
and received that advice; isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And you still believe you talked to him by

phone, don't you ?
A.

Yes.

Q.

It was Mr. Demita who actually went to his

office and met with him; isn't that true?
A.

No, he was the one that was talking on the

phone with me.
Q.

So it was Mr. Demita who called Mr. Chuntz?

A.

I don't know who dialed the number, but it

was -- I needed some attorney and I didn't ever have
an attorney in my life so I asked my son which
attorney I could find this information from, and he
suggested Howard Chuntz.
Q.

And when you signed the quit claim deed I

asked you if you believed the home was worth --or the
property was worth $190,000, and your answer was yes,
wasn't it?
A.

Say that again.

Q.

The home and the land that you quit claim

deeded to Mr. Demita, if it hadn't been divided I
asked you if you believed it was worth $190,000, and
you said yes, you believed that, didn't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you still believe that?

A.

That is what the county had when they sent

10

our tax notice.
Q.

And you received from Mr. Demita for your

one-half interest $10; is that correct?
A.

Not correct.

Q*

Did he give you any money?

A.

He gave me labor, which would amount to more

than enough.
Q.

So when you say you gave it to him for an

estate plan, you're now saying it wasn't an estate
plan, you sold him your property?
MR. CHUNTZ:

Objection, your Honor, she

hasn't said it wasn't for estate planning.

He's

mischaracterizing the witness' statement.
THE COURT:
Q.

Sustained.

BY MR. PATTON:

How many children do you

have, ma' am?
A.

Five.

Q.

Are they all still alive?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are all of their names on that quit claim

deed?
A.

No.

Q.

Just Mr. Demita's?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you did that for estate planning

11

purposes?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you intend -- did you intend to

continue living in the home?

When you signed the deed

did you plan to continue living in the home?
A.

Actually I didn't have any plans.

Q.

You had no plans?

A.

No plans.

Q.

Did you continue to live in the home?

A.

I did, but--

Q.

Did you believe that Mr. Demita was going to

force you to not live in the home?

Did you expect he

was going to force you out of the home?
A.

Again, I never had any thoughts about

anything like that.
Q.

When did you intend for him to actually own

the half-interest in the home?

Was it when you died

or was it when you gave him the deed?
MR. CHUNTZ:

Objection, your Honor, that

calls for a legal conclusion, the deed and delivery of
the deed created ownership, occupancy has nothing to
do with that.

I think the questions are confusing to

the witness.
THE COURT:

He's not asking for a legal

conclusion, he wants to know what her intent was,

1

overruled.

2
3

MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe he could rephrase it in a
way that doesn't--

4

THE COURT:

Go ahead and rephrase it.

5

MR. PATTON:

And I'll do that, your Honor.

6

Q-

BY MR. PATTON:

I'm not trying to trick you,

7

ma'am.

8

that he would immediately own half the home when you

9

gave him the deed, or did you plan that he got it when

10

I'm trying to figure out this:

you died?

did you plan

Do you understand the difference?

11

A.

Okay, say that slower.

12

Q.

Did you plan that he would get the home when

13

you deeded it to him?

14

the deed that, "I'm giving you half my home now," or

15

did you plan that he wouldn't actually get that until

16

you died?

17

MR. CHUNTZ:

In other words when you signed

Your Honor, objection again.

18

That goes to the question of ownership as opposed to

19

the question of occupancy.

20

be confused as to whether her leaving the home had to

21

do with ownership or not.

22

technicalities that we understand but lay men don't

23

particularly understand.

24
25

THE COURT:

I think the witness could

I mean these are legal

Well, I think you can follow up

with your own questions to her to help her understand.

13

I think Mr. Patton's question is appropriate, it only
goes to what she-MR. PATT0N:

May I approach the witness,

your Honor?
THE COURT:
MR. PATT0N:
THE COURT:
Q.

--her intent.
May I approach the witness?
Go ahead.

BY MR. PATTON:

Mrs. Bradford, I'm going to

show you some questions that I asked you last year at
the deposition.

My question was, "When did you intend

for him to get it?" And your answer was?
A.

"The date that I signed it over to him."

Q.

And then my question was, "So you intended

it to be his at that time?"

And what was your answer?

A.

"Yes."

Q.

And then my question was, "But you continued

to live in the home?"

And what was your answer?

A.

"And why not?"

Q.

And then you said, "Why not?"

And then I

pressed you further, I asked the question again, "You
continued to live in the home, yes or no?" And what
was your answer?
A.

"Yes."

Q.

And you still live in the home?

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

So even though you gave him the deed, you

lived in the home?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you used it as your primary residence?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And I asked you -- may I approach the

witness again?
THE COURT:
Q.

You may.

BY MR. PATTON:

My question was, "Did you

tell my client, Mr. Bradford, that you had signed that
quit claim deed?"

And what was your answer?

A.

"I had no reason to."

Q.

Do you remember having an argument with my

client in July of 1996?
A.

(No response)

Q.

Do you remember some engineers coming to the

A.

Can I answer your first question?

Q.

You bet.

A.

I can remember having arguments with your

home?

client continuously through our marriage.
Q.

Do you remember a specific argument that

happened in July of 1996 when there were some
engineers in the home?
A.

Yes.

Do you remember that day?

15

Q.

And did you and he have an argument?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And was he complaining that he didn't want

the home condemned?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And he was also complaining that he didn't

like Mr. Demita living there for nothing, without
paying; isn't that true?
A,

That's what he claimed, but that wasn't

true, that he was living for nothing.
Q.

When you signed this quit claim deed to Mr.

Demita August 8th, within a month of the argument that
takes place in July -- you acknowledge you had that
argument, right ?
A.

In July we had an argument.

Q.

You signed the quit claim in August, right?

When you signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita,
did you have any side agreements with him concerning
that quit claim deed?

In other words, he's going to

give it back to you or anything like that?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you have an agreement that he would

continue to allow you to live there?
A.

We didn't discuss anything at all.

just doing what I wanted to do.

I was

16

Q.

So you didn't have a discussion about it?

A.

No, that I remember.

Q.

When you deeded that property away to Mr.

Detnita, the property that you kept in your possession,
was it worth $40,000 or $50,000?

In other words, your

furniture, your car, everything else you owned, was it
worth $40,000?
A.

You mean if I sold it?

Q.

Right. May I approach again, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Q.

You may.

BY MR. PATTON:

I took your deposition last

year, and my question was, "The real property that you
deeded away, did you own any other assets that were
worth $40,000 or $50,000?" And what was your answer?
A.

"No."

Q.

And my question was, "Did you own any other

assets that were worth $85,000 or $90,000?" And what
was your answer?
A.

"No."

Q.

And you don't own any property now that is

worth $40,000 or $50,000, do you?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you remember filing an affidavit in this

matter for an order to show cause?
A.

What do you mean?

17

Q.

A document called an affidavit.

A.

That I signed?

Q.

Yes. Do you remember signing one?

A.

About what?
MR. PATTON:

May I approach the witness,

your Honor?
THE COURT:
Q.

You may.

BY MR. PATTON:

Let me show you what's been

marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification.
It's entitled, "Affidavit of Andrea Bradford," and it
purports to have been signed by Andrea Bradford.

Do

you recognize that document?
A.

Yes, that's -- you're right.

Q.

I want you to continue looking at that. The

first paragraph says that you're the defendant in the
action, that just labels who you are; is that right?
A.

Right.

Q.

And then it indicates that you received a

one-half joint tenancy interest in 1989, that's
paragraph 2, right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you state that during your 12 years

of marriage you've helped to maintain the property,
care for it and improve it.
A.

Yes.

1
2
3

Q.

What improvements did you make to the

property during the 12 years of the marriage, ma'am?
A.

When I say improve it, does that mean that I

4

have to -- are you saying that it was from my own

5

personal money or from our marital money that I made

6

the improvements?

7

Q.

Ma'am, I didn't write the affidavit, I'm

8

asking you what you meant.

9

meant ?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

What did you mean?

12
13

THE COURT:

MR. PATTON:

THE COURT:

I think I have it, let's just

MR. PATTON:

I'm referring to paragraph 3 of

her affidavit.

20

THE COURT:

21

THE WITNESS:

22
23
24
25

I

make sure it's the right one.

18
19

May I approach, your Honor?

can give you a copy of the affidavit, if you want it.

16
17

Which paragraph are you

referring to?

14
15

Do you know what you

Q.

Okay.
You want -- okay--

BY MR. PATTON:

Let me ask you this, did you

build on any rooms on the home?
A.

No, but more important, I built -- I had

installed the basic utilities that we needed that

19

weren't there when I moved in.
Q.

What basic utilities were those?

A.

I don't have the drain field with me here,

but I have the others with me, the documents what I
improved on.
Q.
you make?

And I'm just asking what improvements did
I'm not asking to see the documents, I just

want to know what-A.

I called up -- this was one of our very

first arguments.
Q.

Stop there.

I don't want an explanation.

A.

Okay, because you said--

Q.

Did you build on a room?

Let me ask you

that, did you build a room or make any additions to
the home?
A.

Yes, I made additions to the home.

Q.

Just tell me what the exact additions --

just list what the additions were.
A.

One was a sewer so we could use the septic

tank -- sewage system.

I had to order a new drain

field.
Q.

So you improved the septic system?

A.

No, there was no septic system there when I

moved in. The black sludge was coming up into the
home in the basement where I had to take a shower, and

1

there was no plumbing sewage place, there was nothing

2

there for a sewage to go to, it was plugged with a

3

piece of wood, so I had to keep unplugging the piece

4

of wood to use the shower that I had to have to take a

5

shower, and then plug the piece back in.

6

Q.

Ma'am, I know you want to tell your story,

7

and your counsel can let you do that.

8

let me ask you this.

9

you moved into the home?

I just asked --

Was there indoor plumbing when

10

A.

Not up to city code, no.

11

Q.

But there was indoor plumbing?

12

A.

Very poor.

13

Q.

Just yes or no.

14

A.

There was some plumbing, I'll say, some.

15

Q.

And so when you say that the addition was

16
17

made, what you did was you improved the plumbing?
A.

Yes. And then another thing I improved, I

18

improved was there was also -- I ordered a -- the

19

chimney hadn't been cleaned for long years -- many

20

years, so I improved to have the chimney cleaned, but

21

the furnace man said to have the coal furnace cleaned

22

so that --to eliminate all of the coal smoke that was

23

coming throughout the house constantly, so when I had

24

it cleaned the furnace man said the coal furnace was

25

so defective that the tears -- I think that's the

21

word -- were all —
Q.

Did you add a furnace, is that what —

A.

So I ordered a new furnace and changed it

from coal to gas furnace.
Q.

So you ordered a new furnace and you

improved the septic system?
A.

And also the well, the drinking water, and

the water I used for brushing my teeth and the shower
was contaminated, so I had to have it tested at the —
by the State, and I have a thing here t o —
Q.

Did you dig a new well?

A.

No, we didn't.

Our bishop asked George

to — more or less told George to get on the city
water right now.
Q.

So did you get on city water?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now besides improving the septic system,

changing the furnace and changing to city water, did
you make any improvements to the property or any
additions?
A.

What would entail improvements?

Q.

Well, I don't know, that's why I asked you.

You said you made improvements and I asked you what
they were.
A.

Now you've listed three.

In the back, out in the back where the farm
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is I did a lot of cleaning up to improve the
sanitation and the health and life risks that were
there.
Q.

So you also cleaned up around the home?

A.

In the home and in the back of the whole

property.
Q.

What else did you do?

A.

I did so much I don't think I'd ever be able

to tell you here.
Q.

Well, I'm just asking you what your

improvements were.

Are those the big items that you

did?
A.

Those are the main ones, but there are many,

many smaller ones that were equally as threatening to
my health and my life.
Q.

So those were day-to-day maintenance items;

is that right?

The other items were more day-to-

day -- they weren't a big project, but you would work
on a regular basis; is that what you're saying?
A.

Now what did you say?

Q.

You've listed the main items that you

improved; is that correct, the ones you've listed?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you state that there were other

things that you did, right?
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A.

Yes, many.

Q.

But those were more on a day-to-day basis

and not a big project like improving the sewer or
changing the plumbing.

We're talking day-to-day go

out and haul trash away, clean things up and make it
more presentable; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you say that you maintained the

property, that's what you're saying when you
maintained it and cared for it; isn't that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You also indicate in paragraph 6, it says,

"My conveyance of my interest in this subject real
property did not and has not made me insolvent."
Isn't that what you said?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you mean?

A.

Well, I asked you what insolvent meant

because I'm not that-Q.

And I'm asking you what you meant when you

filed the affidavit.
A.

I thought it meant that I would be

destitute, or something like that, I don't know, and I
never lacked for anything, even with my conveyance, I
know I would not lack.
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Q.

And the reason you didn't lack is because

you were married to Mr. Bradford who supported you;
isn't that true?
A.

That's kind of questionable.

Q.

Are you saying you can support yourself?

A.

I never felt that I was supported.

Q.

Are you saying you can support yourself if

you're divorced, that you don't need money from Mr.
Bradford?
A.

I don't know the future because I can't

foresee what I might -- I'm 65, I don't know if I'll
be -- my health might deteriorate or whatever, I can't
foresee the future.
Q.

The fact of the matter is, ma'am, when you

signed that affidavit saying that you weren't
insolvent, you didn't know what the word "insolvent"
meant, did you?
A.

I thought it meant being without, I think,

without anything.
MR. PATTON:

I have no further questions of

this witness.
THE COURT:

Let's take a five minute break.

We'll be in recess for five minutes.
(Short recess)
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

When I took your deposition
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last year, I asked you this question:

"Did you owe

Mr. Demita -- when you signed this quit claim deed to
Mr. Demita, did you owe him any money?ff

And what was

your answer?
A.

"No."

Q.

And I said, "Okay, can you tell me why you

signed the quit claim deed to Mr. Demita?"

And your

answer was, "Sure." And then I said, "Why did you
sign it?" And what was your answer?
A.

"It was simply estate planning."

Q.

And you didn't owe him any money when you

signed it, did you?
A.

No.
MR. PATTON:

Thank you.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHUNTZ:
Q.

Mr. Patton was asking you about improvements

that you made to the property, or that were made to
the property during the 12 plus years that you've
lived there.

Was anything done to the roof?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was done to the roof?

A.

The whole entire roof was shingled.

Q.

Was there any painting done to the property?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

What was painted, inside or out?

A.

Inside and -- the house is brick, so all the

trim was painted, and the porch railings, and inside
rooms have been painted because I asked my son to help
me paint.
Q.

Now Mr. Patton was asking you some questions

about insolvency.

At the time in August of 1996 when

you deeded the property to your son, did you owe
anybody any money at that time?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you have any bills that were

outstanding?
A.

No.

Q.

And you were able to pay for your living

expenses between what you got from Social Security and
what Mr. Bradford provided?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Patton asked you about a time in July

when Mr. Bradford came home and there were some
engineers at the house.

Were the engineers at the

house concerning condemning the house?
A.

No.

Q.

Was there any discussion at all at that time

or at any time about tearing the house down?
A.

No.

1
2

Q.

Were you and Mr. Bradford planning and

working on developing the property?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

You were planning on selling it?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Could the property have been developed

7

without tearing down the home?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

When Mr. Patton was asking you about this

10

July argument, you had wanted to tell the Court

11

something about this argument or arguments.

12

you tell the Court about arguments with George.

13

George and you have arguments often or not?

Why don't
Did

14

A.

Yes, very often.

15

Q.

About how often would you say that you and

16

George had arguments?

17

A.

Out of a month's time, you mean?

18

Q.

Okay, out of a month's time.

19

A.

Every three days and more.

20

Q.

Did George ever talk about divorce during

21
22

these arguments?
A.

He always threatened me with divorce if he

23

didn't like the decisions I made for the property --

24

of repairing and any -- even the little things in the
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kitchen, if I threw kitchen garbage in the garbage and

1

if I wanted to have a place to dump ray garbage, he

2

always went into ranting and raving and rages --

3

violent rages to me all the time.

4

Q.

Did he raise the issue of divorce during

5

these times?

6

A.

Yes, every time he threatened me with

7

divorce when I wouldn't agree with the way he wanted

8

things done.

9

Q.

10

So divorce was a regular and common subject

in your household?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And what was your reaction to these threats

13

of divorce?

14

A.

At first I was frightened, but he always

15

ended up saying that he was sorry after, and he would

16

always apologize and be -- lived like civil together,

17

and so I never paid much attention after that because

18

he was always threatening me and then never doing

19

anything, so I just assumed that we never would ever

20

be divorced.

21

Q.

22

Did you take his threats of divorce

seriously?

23

A.

Never after so many times, no.

24

Q.

Did you make plans or take actions on the

25

basis that when he told you he was going to divorce
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you that you better do something about that?
A.

No.

Q.

This argument that Mr. Patton refers to that

occurred in July of 1996, did George threaten to
divorce you at that argument?
A.

Yes, he was constantly threatening me around

that time.
Q.

And did things get resolved between you and

he after that argument?
A.

Yes, we still--

Q.

Did he go back to being civil?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Between that July argument and when you

deeded the property -- quit claimed the property to
your son in August, was he still threatening to
divorce you during this time?
A.

(No response)

Q.

Let me ask you a different question.

Were

you and Mr. Bradford continuing to attempt to develop
the property after the July argument?
A.

Yes, we were always doing that.

Q.

And between this July argument and the day

you deeded the property to your son, did Mr. Bradford
tell you again that he was going to divorce you?
A.

What was that again?

1

Q.

After the July argument, between that time

2

and when you deeded you property in August to James,

3

did Mr. Bradford, while you were continuing to try to

4

develop the property, did he threaten to divorce you

5

again?

6
7
8
9
10
11

A.

During the time we were developing he never

ever mentioned divorce then.
Q.

Well, he mentioned it at this argument in

July when you were developing it.
A.

Right, just because he was mad for that one

day, yeah.

12

Q.

And then he let it go?

13

A.

Yes, because then it was just the same

14

pattern, he just said he was sorry and apologized and

15

then afterwards keep on talking about developing.

16

Q.

So when you deeded your property to James in

17

August, you didn't do it because you were concerned

18

about George's divorcing you?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

You did it because you wanted to take care

21

of the problem of if you died before George, George

22

would get all of the property and your children would

23

get nothing?

24

A.

Right.

25

Q.

Now there's been some suggestion that you
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didn't do this deed to James for estate planning
because you only gave the property to James and not to
your other children.

Why didn't you deed the property

to your other children's names?
A.

Because my other four children are in

another age bracket, they're ten years way over James,
and they've already established themselves well in
life, and they all own their own -- have their own
home, and I wanted before I died to make sure that all
my children had a home.
MR. CHUNTZ: Thank you.
MR. PATTON:

First your Honor, let me submit

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 for identification as
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.

It's her affidavit.

MR. CHUNTZ: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Number 2 will be received.
(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence)
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PATTON:
Q.

First I want to make it clear in my mind,

when you say you deeded to James Demita, you intended
for him to get the entire thing.
A.

What entire thing?

Q.

Your half interest in that home.

right, just--

Isn't that

32

A.

Just whatever I owned, yes.

Q.

And so you didn't intend for your other

children to get any of it?
A.

I know my children, and I know that if any

of my any other children were in need that James would
help them and give them whatever they needed.

I know

that.
Q.

But when you signed the quit claim deed it

wasn't your intent that they each get the same amount,
it was that it all go to him; is that what your
testimony just was?
A.

Yes, because I know he would do the right

thing with it.
MR. PATTON:

May I approach the witness,

your Honor?
THE COURT:
Q.

You may.

BY MR. PATTON:

you this question:

At the deposition I asked

"Is there a reason you didn't quit

claim to all of them?"

And what was your answer?

A.

"Just to simplify it," like I said.

Q.

And then you went on, what did--

A.

"I knew James would do the right thing and

share and share alike."
Q.

And then my next question was, "Did you give

him instructions to do that?"

And what was your

1

answer?

2

A.

3

he would do."

4

Q.

5

"I didn't need to. He told me that's what

So he told you he would share equally with

| his brothers and sisters?

6

A.

Only if there was a need.

7

Q.

Only if there was a need?

8

A.

But I didn't add that on there. That was--

9

MR. CHUNTZ:

I'm going to object to this

10

line of questioning, your Honor, I don't think it goes

11

to anything that's relevant.

12

MR. PATTON:

They opened the door.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PATTON:

15

MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

(Court handles another matter)

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PATTON:

Overruled.

Go ahead.

No further questions.

You may step down.

All right.

20

Bradford to the stand.

21

COURT CLERK:

Your Honor, I would call George

You do solemnly swear that the

22

testimony you are about to give in this case now

23

pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole

24

truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

25

THE WITNESS: Yes.
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GEORGE BRADFORD
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PATTON:
Q.

Mr. Bradford, I'm going to show you some

documents that I've marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3
for identification.
THE COURT:
MR. PATTON:
Q.

It's just a packet of documents.
Is this a courtesy copy?
That's correct.

BY MR. PATTON:

Mr. Bradford, will you

please state your name for the record, please?
A.

George Roy Bradford.

Q.

Mr. Bradford, are you familiar with the

property that we've been talking about here today,
this home and land?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How are you familiar with it?

A.

That's where I was born and raised.

Q.

When you say were you born and raised there,

what do you mean you were born and raised there?
you actually born on that property?
A.

No, I was born in the old house that my

father sold and moved up town.
Q.

Did that home used to be part of this

Were
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property?
A.

No.

Yes, excuse me.

Q.

And the land that we're talking about, it's

a home and how many acres?
A.

There's only 20 acres all together.

Q.

And the first Bradford that owned that home

and acreage, who was that?
A.

Pleasant Sprague Bradford.

Q.

And who was that in relationship to you?

A.

My father's dad, my grandpa.

Q.

So your grandpa owned it originally?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And then who owned it after him?

A.

My father, Roy Bradford.

Q.

And?

A.

Minnie Williams Bradford.

Q.

And then who owned it after them?

A.

I did.

Q.

And when did you get it?

Did you get it

before or after you married Andrea?
A.

It was before.

Q.

And when you married Andrea did you owe any

money on that property?
A.

No.

Q.

I see you looking and thinking hard.

Do you
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have some trouble with your thought process on
occasion?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

Sometimes my mind goes almost blank, I

can't-Q.

Did you ever have any accidents that has

complicated this?
A.

When I was three I was kicked in the head by

a horse -- a colt, it wasn't a horse, and it seemed to
slow my thinking a lot.
Q.

Can you tell the Court how much education

you have?
A.

Well, I graduated from high school, 12

years, and then I have -- after they closed the
foundry down at Geneva they told us that we had an
option of we could go take a class in UVSC in several
different areas, auto repair or maintenance or
mechanic.
Q.

So did you get that education?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How many additional years?

A.

I started in 1985 and it was a two year

course.
Q.

Do you remember marrying Andrea in 1985?

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Were you still working at Geneva when you

3

married her?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And how long had you worked at Geneva?

6

A.

Total?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Twenty-two years something.

9

Q.

And so when you were with Andrea working at

10
11
12

Geneva, when did you retire from Geneva?
A.

I believe it was 1986 that they ordered us

off the property.

13

THE COURT:

14

I'm clear.

15

started in 1985.

What did he start in 1985?

16

MR. PATTON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. PATTON:

19

Just a minute, let me make sure
You said he

He married in 1985.
I got that.
And he started an educational

program in 1985.

20

THE COURT:

Thank you.

21

Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

You worked at Geneva a total

22

of 22 years?

23

A.

And so many months, yes.

24

Q.

And you married Andrea in 1985?

25

A.

Yes.

1
2
3

Q.

And then you worked at Geneva another year

before-A.

No -- well, it was close to a year because

4

1986, I believe, was when they ordered us off the

5

place.

6

Q.

So it was about a year.

So out of the 22

7

years that you worked there you were married to Andrea

8

one year?

9

A.

Yeah.

10

Q.

I'm going to ask you to look at the very

11

first document on top that you've got there.

It's a

12

document entitled, "Order of Dismissal," and it

13

purports to be a divorce action George Bradford and

14

Andrea Bradford, just the very first page, don't turn

15

back, very first page.

16

divorce action against Andrea in 1992?

Do you remember filing a

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And that was--

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

And that was dismissed in 1993 in February;

21

is that right?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And you and Andrea decided to try and make

24
25

your marriage work; is that right?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Did you continue to have arguments and

discussions about divorce?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you continue to have arguments and

discussions about divorce up until the time you filed
this divorce action?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember an argument that you had

with Andrea in July of 1996?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And was that at your home?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it like all of the other arguments or

was it smaller or was it bigger?
A.

It was bigger.

Q.

Why was it bigger?

A.

Because I had a feeling that those engineers

were down there for a purpose, and-Q.

For what purpose did you think they were

there for?
A.

To condemn the place.

Q.

And when you argued with Andrea that day,

how long did that argument last?
A.

Well, I worked at the school, and I don't

get off until about 4 -- it must have been off and on
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the rest of the day.
Q.

Did you hear Andrea say that that argument

sort of slopped over --in other words, it was around
that time --in other words it wasn't just that day,
but it was actually around that time.

Do you recall

that happening?
A.

Yes, around that day?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you argue about anything other than just

the fact that the people were there, or did you argue
about anything else, too?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you argue about Mr. Demita?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was that argument about?

A.

That he wasn't living up to the verbal

agreement that we made, and that he -- I wanted him
out of there.
Q.

You wanted him out of where?

A.

Out of the place, out of the home because of

his long stay, that he had already been there.
Q.

And what verbal agreement wasn't he living

up to?
A.

We made a verbal agreement that he would pay
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all the utility bills and he never did, he only paid
for the first three months, and then after that I paid
them.
Q.

When was that agreement made?

A.

In December of 1985.

Q.

In December of 1985?

A.

I mean December of 1995, excuse me.

Q.

So he moved in in December of 1995?

A.

No, he lived there in -- he moved in

December of 1995.
Q.

Did he bring anyone with him?

A.

No.

Q.

Did he have his son with him?

A.

No.

Q.

But did he have an agreement to pay

utilities?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How many months did he pay utilities?

A.

Three months.

Q.

And then what happened?

A.

And then I paid them from then on.

Q.

Did there come a time that his son started

living with you, too?
A.

Well, after he was born, yes.

Q.

When was that?
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A.

Well, he's 11 now, so it's been 11 years

Q.

Now in the July argument it's your testimony

ago.

that you told your wife you wanted Mr. Demita out of
that house?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had you and your wife and Mr. Demita, had

you guys talked about trying to develop the property
part of that?
A.

What day are we using?

Q.

July of 1996 when you have the fight, prior

to July of 1996 -- when the engineers w ere there,
prior to that date had you and she and Mr. Demita
talked about developing that property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had you talked about selling the home or

bulldozing the house down?
A.

No.

Q.

What was the agreement in terms of

developing the house?
A.

Well, it started out with two other

developers that were interested in it, and it fell
through, so James claimed he could do it himself, so I
wanted to have it developed.

I accepted until I found

out later that none of the stuff that he was telling

1

me was true.

2

Q.

3

Was there a reason the property in the back

of your home couldn'rt be developed?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

What was thei problem?

6

A.

It was on a flood plain, mostly, and that

7

there was no access tc> it -- the code of the city

8

required you to have 160 some-odd feet to get to the

9

property, and there wasn't--

10
11

Q.

You say 160-odd feet, is that 160-odd feet

on a city road?

12

A.

Yes, for a city road, a double lane road

13

going down.

14

Q.

And was there 160 some-odd feet?

15

A.

No, sir, there wasn't.

16

Q.

Was there 160 some-odd feet if the house was

17

taken down?

18

A.

Yes.

No, no, excuse me, there wasn't

19

because -- I'm not sure of the width of the place, I

20

think it's 13 0 some-odd feet.

21

Q.

Did you ever agree that the house would be

22

taken down?

23

A.

No.

24

(Direct testimony of Mr. Bradford by Mr. Patton

25

continues.

Certain portions extracted)
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Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

Other than the thousand

dollars you took out and $700 you took out, since this
divorce has been pending have you taken any other
money out of your savings or IRA, that you're aware
of?
A.

No.

Q.

Not that you're aware of?

A.

Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q.

Have you made additional contributions to

it?

Do you put money in each month?
A.

No, I just barely have enough to pay the

bills, utility bills.
Q.

The next document claims it's a warranty

deed.
A.

Yes.

Q.

It says it's a warranty deed and it's dated

November 1989, and it purports to be a deed
transferring property to you and Andrea as husband and
wife with full rights of survivorship and not as
tenants in common.

Is that the deed that you signed

that transferred the property to you and Andrea?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then the next page is a document

entitled, "Quit Claim Deed," and that's the document
that purports that Andrea transferred it to Mr.
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Demita.

Were you aware that she had done that?

A.

No, sir, I wasn't.

Q.

How did you become aware of the fact that

she had done that?
A.

Through my daughter.

Q.

How did your daughter tell you?

A.

My lawyer asked for a copy of the deed, and

my daughter went to the courthouse to get it and then
she found out that this had been done.
Q.

When you say the deed, you didn't mean the

quit claim deed, did you?
A.

No.

Q.

You mean the deed transferring it to you and

Andrea?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you weren't aware that there had even

been a quit claim deed?
A.

No.

Q.

And when did you find out there had been a

quit claim deed?
A.

When my daughter, Phyllis, told me.

Q.

Do you know about what year that was, was it

in 1996, was it in 1997?
A.

It happened in 1997.

Q.

Was that at or about the time you filed for
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divorce, was it about the same time?
A.

Yes, about the same.
MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, we would submit

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 for identification as
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.
MR. CHUNTZ:

I have no objection, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Three will be received.

(Exhibit No. 3 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

Mr. Bradford, did you hear

the statements that were made by your wife here today?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you agree with all those statements?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Do you think she's misrepresented some of

the facts to the Court?
A.

Yes.

Q.

If you were to tell the Court what you

believe the real problem in your marriage to Mrs.
Bradford is, what would you be telling him you think
the real problem in the marriage is?
A.

Having her son living with us and his son.

Q.

Were you residing in Utah County for three

months immediately prior to the commencement of this
action?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And were you a resident of Utah County?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And in your complaint for divorce you've

alleged that there are irreconcilable differences
between you and she; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And are there in fact irreconcilable

differences?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And are those differences Mr. Demita?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And his continuation in the home?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And as a result of that are you requesting

the Court to award you a divorce?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And if the Court awards the divorce, are you

asking the Court to set aside the transfer from your
wife to Mr. Demita -- set that aside and say it
belongs to you and she?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then are you asking the Court to award

the property to you as your premarital property?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

I want to make it clear, and I want to be

fair to her and I want to be fair to you and I want to
be fair to the Court -- the improvements, the furnace,
the sewage system, the painting, the other things that
she described, where did the money come from that
those things were paid for?
A.

Out of my pocket.

Like I say, I had to use

up that sub that had collected at Geneva before I was
eligible -- before I could get any pension from them
or before I was able to even start the rule of 65,
that had to be used up first, she told me, the lady
over at Geneva.
Q.

If the Court orders that we can't set aside

the deed, are you asking the Court to let you purchase
Mr. Demita out?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you need 90 to 120 days to do that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you understand if the Court does that

and you can't, that the Court's likely to say that Mr.
Demita can purchase you out?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you have any reason to disbelieve that

the home and the property is worth $180,000, less the
$9,000 to fix the tanks?
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A.

(No response)

Q-

Remember the appraisals we both--

A.

Yes.

Q.

And both appraisals were for $180,000,

weren't they?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then there's the tank issue and it's

going tc cost $9,000 to remove them, right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

If they're removed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you believe they need to be removed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you hear your wife testify that on the

date she signed that quit claim deed to Mr. Demita she
didn't owe him any money?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that true?

A.

I don't know about their financial business.

From all that I know I don't think she owes him any.
MR. PATTON:

Thank you, no further

questions.
(Cross examination of Mr. Bradford beginning by Mr.
Chuntz.
///

Certain portions extracted)

1
2

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHUNTZ:

3

Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Bradford.

4

A.

Good afternoon.

5

Q.

One little item that you were just

6

testifying about when Mr. Patton finished with you was

7

these items that were about your property, the

8

motorcycle, some tanks, some things like that, that

9

was all rusted out stuff that you actually helped Mr.

10

Demita load onto a truck and take down to the scrap

11

metal place?

12

A.

No, I didn't help him.

13

Q.

You didn't help him with that at all?

14

A.

No, I didn't.

I dug that one out of the

15

river, somebody had hauled it down there to the --

16

dumped some fill in the river, and I had dug it out

17

there and hauled it up there, and it was clear out of

18

sight.

19

Q.

But this was all old stuff.

20

A.

Well, does that matter how old it is, it's

21

still important to me.

22

frame.

23
24
25

Q.

That's all I wanted was the

So it wasn't a matter of how much value it

had, it had sentimental value to you?
A.

Well, it's just that I was going to use it

1

someday.

2

the cycle, making another thing out of it, and I

3

needed the frame to do it.

4
5

Q.

I had high hopes of using it, not rebuilding

Now the tanks that are still buried on the

property, they're still there now?

6

A.

Yes, sir.

7

Q.

And you haven't had to remove them anytime

8

during the years that you've owned the property; is

9

that correct?

10

A.

That's right, yes.

11

Q.

And nobody's told you that you had to remove

12

them, have they?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

As far as you know at this point in time

15
16
17

there's no need to remove any of the tanks?
A.

I guess not if nobody demands that they be

removed.

18

Q.

You got this property from your mom and dad?

19

A.

I inherited it, yes.

20

Q.

When you say you inherited it, they were

21

alive when they deeded it to you, weren't they?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

So you got it by deed from them?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

It was a gift?

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

At the time that they deeded this property

to you •-- do you have brothers and sisters?

3

A.

Yes.

Q-

How many?

6

A.

I have a brother and two sisters.

7

Q.

They didn't deed any part of this property

4
5

8

:

to your brother and sisters, did they?

9

A.

Of the property that I have?

10

Q.

Uh-huh.

11

A.

No, but they were questioned about it if

12

they wanted it, and they all refused it.

13

Q.

Your dad, he got the property from--

14

A.

His father, yes, sir, Pleasant Sprague.

15

Q.

And his father deeded it to him alone,

16

didn't he?

17

A.

From what I know.

18

Q.

And then later your dad added your mother's

19

name after they got married, your dad added your

20

mother's name to the property; is that right?

21
22
23
24
25

A.

I don't know, I just know her name was on it

with dad's on the deed.
Q.

But originally it was deeded -- let me show

you this and ask if you've ever seen this document.
A.

No, I've never.

1

Q.

Is that a deed to the property?

2

MR. PATTON:

3

never seen it before.

4
5

THE COURT:

10

Sustained as to the form of the

THE WITNESS:

Dora Hansen, that's my

father's mother.

8
9

I don't think he knows.

question.

6
7

Objection, he's indicated he's

Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Did she deed that -- does

that deed deal with the property that you presently
own?

11

A.

Let's see--

12

Q.

Does that have the same legal description on

13

it as the property that you presently own?

14

MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, maybe we could

15

short circuit this.

I'm not sure my client would

16

know.

17

counsel wants to bring it (inaudible) we might be able

18

to stipulate.

I'm not sure he can read well enough -- if

19

THE WITNESS:

I've never read this before, I

20

don't know -- it's new to me, no.

21

to the property where we live?

22

MR. PATTON:

Does this pertain

Your Honor, counsel has two

23

documents, and maybe if he would just proffer what

24

they are, it might save us some time because I don't

25

think I'd object to them.

We've already agreed that

1

documents like this could come in and we would save

2

bringing people in to testify, and I'm not sure my

3

client knows.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. CHUNTZ

State your proffer.
I have a deed -- all of these

6

deeds deal with the subject farm, the legal

7

descriptions are the same.

8

Hansen.

9

Q.

I have a deed from Dora

BY MR. CHUNTZ: Was Dora Hansen your

10

grandmother?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And the deed deeds the subject property to

13

Roy Bradford, and that's your father, right?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And then subsequently I have a deed from Roy

16

Bradford to Roy and Minnie Bradford as joint tenants,

17

and Minnie Bradford is your mother?
A.

18

MR. PATTON:

19
20

We wouldn't have any dispute

that those are the documents (inaudible).
THE COURT:

21
22

Yes, sir.

Have them marked and they'll be

received.
Q.

23

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

You have filed for divorce

24

previous to this time against Mrs. Bradford, haven't

25

you?

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

That was in 1992?

3

A.

1992, yes.

4

Q.

And you were the one that filed?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q-

And then you had that divorce dismissed,

7

didn't you, in February of 1993?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You've indicated already that you had

10

several discussions -- frequently discussed divorcing

11

Mrs. Bradford with her over the years that you were

12

married; is that true?

13

A.

Off an on, yes.

14

Q.

How often did that happen?

15

A.

Maybe every other month or more often, I

16

don't -- I'm not sure.

17

Q.

Maybe even more often than that?

18

A.

Yes, on times.

19

Q.

So divorce was a frequent conversation

20

around your home, wasn't it, but you didn't act on it

21

very often, did you?

22
23
24
25

A.

Not until this event took place that really

stirred me up.
Q.

What stirred you up the first time?

you file for divorce the first time in 1992?

Why did

A.

1

My wife was stepping out on me.
MS. BRADFORD:

2
3

me.
THE WITNESS:

4
5
6
7
8

That's his first wife, not

In 1992, excuse me.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Q.

In 1992. Why did you file

for divorce from Andrea in 1992?
I really don't remember right now.

A.

I can't

remember.

9

Q.

You married Andrea in 1985?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And then in 198 9 you gave her the subject

12

property in joint tenancy; is that right?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

You gave that to her as a gift, didn't you?

15

You wanted her to have-MR. PATTON:

16

Objection, that calls for a

17

legal conclusion.

18

I think he can ask why, but if he wants my client to

19

give a legal conclusion, your Honor, I think that

20

that's an (inaudible) my client may not understand

21

that term.

22

it to her and why he did it. There's a difference

23

between saying that and saying it's a gift.

I think he's already explained why he gave

THE COURT:

24
25

I think he can ask if he signed it,

Q.

Sustained.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

You were happy with Andrea

1

in 1989; were you not?

2

A.

Yes, 1989, yes.

3

Q.

At the time when you deeded the real

4

property over to her--

5

A.

Half, yes.

6

Q.

You were happy?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Did you want to take care of her at that

9

time?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you love her at that time?

12

A.

I must have, yes.

13

Q.

Do you remember at about that time your

14

parents deeding some property over to you and she.

15

their property?

16

A.

At 245?

17

Q.

Pardon?

18

A.

Their property?

19

Q.

Their property.

20

A.

At 245 South Main?

21

Q.

I think so.

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And they deeded that over to you and to

24

Andrea as joint tenants with rights of survivorship;

25

is that correct?

{

1

A.

I don't know how it read, I didn't--

2

Q.

But it was to you and Andrea?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And you didn't try to dissuade them from

5

doing that?

6

put her name on their property, did you?

Andrea's name was added later, yes.

You didn't try to convince them not to

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Because you wanted Andrea to have that as

well with you?

9
10

!

A

-

No.

11

Q.

You didn't?

12

A.

Not necessarily.

13

name on it.

14

Q.

Why did he do that?

15

A.

I don't know.

16

Q.

Did you try to talk him out of it?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

This was at a time when--

19

A.

Ke had deeded it to me first, and then after

My father put Andrea's

20

we were married he added her name onto it, I didn't

21

know it.

22

Q.

You didn't know it?

23

A.

Until she told me. Then the State took it

24
25

from us because of a shortage of time.
Q.

Let me show you this document, the warranty

59

deed-

Is this the property that your mom and dad own

in Spanish Fork?
A.

At 245, where is that?

Q.

I don't know that there's an address on it.

A.

I guess if it's up in town, nine rods south.

Q.

Did they own any other property in town?

A.

No.

Q.

And this is your mother and father's names?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So they were the owners of the property back

in March of 1989?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Who did they deed this property to?

A.

George Bradford and Andrea Bradford, husband

and wife.
MR. CHUNTZ:

May I have this marked?

I move

to admit Exhibit 6.
THE COURT:
MR. PATTON:

Any objections?
No, I'd like counsel to lay a

little more foundation.

I'm not sure my client

understands what it was. Again, this is the type of
document counsel and I talked about, we're not going
to object and bring a lot of people in.
THE COURT:
MR. CHUNTZ:

Is it at 245 South?
Yes, I believe it is.

1

MR. PATTON:

2

THE COURT:

3
4
5

No objection.
It will be received.

(Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

So your parents deeded that

property to you and Andrea, right?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And you didn't try to talk your mom or dad

8
9

out of doing that?
A.

No, sir, we tried to -- not we -- I tried to

10

talk to them that they ought to deed that place to

11

somebody or else the State's going to end up with it.

12

Q.

And so they deeded it to both you and she?

13

A.

Too late. We hadn't had it in our names

14

for -- I believe the time was 33 months, and we only

15

had it 11 months in our name, and dad was in a rest

16

home and as soon as mother passed away the place filed

17

back to dad in his name, and the State said we had to

18

sell it or get -- they just told us we had to sell it

19

in order for dad to stay in the rest home.

20
21
22
23

Q.

Was Andrea taking care of your parents at

that time?
A.

Off and on, yes.

I stayed with mother quite

a bit at nights.

24

Q.

You did?

25

A.

Yes, while dad was in the rest home or while
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she was alone.
Q.

She was down there taking care of your mom

during the day?
A.

At times, not all the time.

Q.

In February of 1996 you were interested in

selling the subject property, weren't you?
A.

1996?

Q.

1996. You entered into a real estate sales

agreement with a Mr. Mullen, GM Development?
A.

I didn't.

Q.

You didn't?

A.

Is that the one that -- okay, it was with

David Gardner and it fell through?
Q.

Let me show you, I believe it probably is,

and I'll show you a document marked Exhibit 7, and let
me ask you if-A.

That's my--

Q.

Is that your signature?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember what that is?

So is that the agreement that was-Do you recall

that agreement?
A.

No, but I signed it.

Q.

Do you recall entering into an agreement

with GM Development and Mr. Mullen?
A.

Well, it's just one that Jim had us sign.
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Q.

Do you remember getting $10,000 earnest

money on the agreement?
A.

He said something about it, but I never did

get it, no.
Q.

The agreement that you recall, did that fall

through?
'

A.

Yes.

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

It fell through?

A.

It didn't go through, yes.

Q.

And you had to give back the earnest money?

A.

I never did see it.

Q.

Do you recall this Exhibit marked No. 8?

This one?

Your signature's on that.
A.

What's this on?

Q.

This is an escrow agreement whereby you

instruct the title company to return the $10,000 to GM
Development.
A.

Yes, he said something about -- Jim

explained something about that if they didn't do it in
so many months, I believe, that you had -- that they
were -- I didn't have to pay it; is that right?
Q.

So you signed that agreement?

A.

Yes, that's my signature.

1

MR. CHUNTZ:

I move to admit 7 and 8.

2

MR. PATTON:

No objection.

3

THE COURT:

Seven and eight will be

4

received.

5

(Exhibit Nos. 7 and 8 received into evidence)

6

Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

So after that deal fell

7

through, you still wanted to develop the property,

8

didn't you?

9

A.

Yes and no because of the funny stories I

10

was getting back from the way the city was accepting

11

it when the city hadn't accepted it at all.

12

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as

13

Exhibit 9 and ask you if your signature appears on

14

this document.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

That document is entitled a "Contract?"

17

MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, I don't have any

18

objection if he stands next to my client and points to

19

the document and help my client find those things.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CHUNTZ:

22

25

I'm going to give him an

opportunity to read it, see if he recalls it.

23
24

Go ahead.

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Yes, I remember it.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

This is an agreement that

you entered into with your wife and James Demita?

1
2

A.

talked to my attorney about and I didn't.

3
4

Yes, this is the one that I should have

Q.

And this is an agreement that was putting a

prior oral agreement in writing?

5

A.

It says yes, 25 percent.

6

Q.

James was going to get 25 percent, wasn't

7

he, of the property?

8

A.

9

the lot, yes.

10
11

Q.

That's what it says on here, yes, value of

So you were willing to transfer a portion of

the proceeds from the sale of those lots--

12

A.

This was if he developed it, which he never

14

Q.

I understand, but you were willing to--

15

A.

Well, why is it still in force?

13

did.

16
17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

Just a minute, sir.

Please

answer the questions.
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

You were willing to go

forward with this transaction?
A.

Yes, if he developed it.

21

MR. CHUNTZ:

I move to admit No. 9.

22

MR. PATTON:

No objection.

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Number 9 will be received.

(Exhibit No. 9 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ: That was in -- you entered
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into that agreement in late April of 1996, right?
A.

What's the date on it, I don't know.

Q.

That's what it says, April 26th.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Did the three of you continue with

development activities, trying to get the property
developed?
A.

No, I think shortly after that I stopped it,

Q.

Did you?

A.

When I found out what he was doing to me.

Q.

When was that?

A.

A little past this date that was on there.

Q.

A little past, is that a few days, a few

When did you stop it?

weeks, a few months?
A.

I don't know when it was. As soon as I

found out from the city that none of this stuff had
been passed through that he said had been all voted
on.

Nothing had been passed by the city, that's what

they told me.
Q.

Let me show you what's been marked as

Exhibit 10. Do you recognize that document?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What's River and Park view Estates?

A.

That's the name we agreed on.

Q.

What is the document?
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A.

What is the document?

Q.

Yes. Have you ever seen this or something

like this before?
A.

This document?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, I guess.

This is the one that they

had --he had LEI map out.
Q.

Who's "he?"

A.

James.

Q.

Did you hire LEI?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Did you have anything to do with LEI?

A.

No.

Q.

How about paying them for their services?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You paid them for their services?

A.

After this was all mapped out, yes.

Q.

You knew they were doing that, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember having the whole property

surveyed?
A.

By LEI?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you talk with LEI about any of this
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development or mapping out the property?
A.

No.

Q.

The date on Exhibit 10 shows 6/96.

Is that

when LEI did its work?
A.

I can't tell you that -- yes, if that's the

date on it.
Q.

Do you have a recollection yourself?

A.

No, I don't.

If that's when it's dated,

that's when they did the work, I guess.
MR. CHUNTZ:
THE COURT:
MR. PATTON:

I move to admit 10.
Any objection?
And 10 was the topographical

map?
MR. CHUNTZ: Yeah, the plat map.
MR. PATTON:
THE COURT:

No objection.
Ten will be received.

(Exhibit No. 10 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Exhibit 11 consists of two

checks for the -- copies of the two checks. Do you
recognize these two checks?
A.

No, I don't. That's not my writing.

Q.

That's not your writing?

A.

No.

Q.

Is this your signature down in here?

A.

This is mine, yes.

1

Q.

That's your signature down in here?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

These are checks to whom?

4

A.

LEI Engineers.

5

Q.

What are the dates on the two checks?

6

A.

June 1st of 1996 and June 17th of 1996.

7

Q.

And are there notations on those checks as

8

to what these payments were for?

9

A.

Subdivision, yes.

10

Q.

These had to do with the subdivision?

11

A.

That's what it says on here, yes.

12

Q.

And you signed these checks?

13

A.

I must have, that's my signature, yes.

14

Q.

But you don't recall now being involved with

15

LEI and what they were doing?

16

the two checks?

17
18

A.

What are the dates on

One is the 1st of June and the other is the

17th.

19

Q.

Of June?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Both in 1996?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

So you were paying money to LEI, signing

24
25

checks, but you didn't know what they were doing?
A.

Okay, this one was on the --he said that
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this on the -- when they mapped it out for $1400.
Q.

And is that the subdivision plot, Exhibit 10

that I just showed you?

That's what that was for when

they mapped it out?
A.

I think so.

Q.

And did you get to see that at the time it

was done?
A.

Showed us that, yes.

Q.

So you did see it and you paid for it?

A.

Yes.
MR. CHUNTZ:

We move to admit Exhibit 11.

MR. PATTON:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Eleven will be received.

(Exhibit No. 11 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

In June of 1996 you were

still working on the project, weren't you?
A.

It looks like it, yes.

When was this

that -- the question before that, what was it you
asked about, if you remember.
Q.

If I remember I'll ask it again.

I don't remember.

I'm sorry,

Let me show you Exhibit 12. Do you

remember getting this bill from LEI?
A.

This is that $1400.

Q.

I think that's a different $1400.

A.

No, I only paid them once, didn't I?

1

Q.

Well, I think not.

2

A.

I made two checks after that $1400?

3

Q.

Let me show you Exhibit 13, and ask you if

4

If it will help--

your signature appears at the bottom of this.

5

A.

Yes, that's it.

6

Q.

That's it?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

That's another check for $1405, that's the

9

amount of this invoice, right?

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

What's the date on the invoice?

12

A.

This is in September.

13

Q.

This is in September, in fact it's September

14

3 0th that you paid it; isn't that correct?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

So you were still working with LEI in

17

September of 1996?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Working on developing this property?

20

A.

It looks like it.

21

MR. CHUNTZ:

I move to admit 12 and 13.

22

MR. PATTON:

No objection.

23

THE COURT:

Twelve and thirteen will be

24

received.

25

(Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13 received into evidence)
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Q.
14.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Let me show you Exhibit No.

Is your signature there on this one?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And this one is made out to Newman Bundy?

A.

Yes, I owed him $500.

Q.

He delivered some dirt to the property,

right?

That was part of the development of the

property, wasn't it?
A.

No, that was part of the -- just to fill up

the land, and they had some dirt they wanted to get
rid of.
Q.

But you needed the dirt to fill in the land?

A.

Yeah, we agreed that -- I agreed to buy it,

Q.

And that was part of the development process

yes.

that you were going through there in September?
A.

Yes, if that's what you want to call it, the

development project. Yeah.
MR. CHUNTZ:

I move to admit 14.

MR. PATTON:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Fourteen will be received.

(Exhibit No. 14 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

In fact, you were still

going forward with the development of the project in
trying to get in position to sell lots and trying to
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have James work with the city all the way up until
April of 1997, weren't you?
A.

I don't know, was it that late?

Q.

Do you remember talking to your daughter,

Phyllis, and asking her to contact the city and find
out what was going on?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was in about April of 1997?

A.

I don't know the time.

Q.

Let me show you Exhibit 15, it's the letter

that Phyllis received.
Look at that letter.

Did you ever get to see this?

Do you remember having a

conversation with Phyllis about that letter or seeing
that letter before?
A.

Just a minute.

I don't remember, but this

is the one that she we went to Comstock and received,
yes.
Q.

Comstock, he's the planning--

A.

Yes, engineer.

Q.

Planning engineer for Spanish Fork?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ask her to go and see him?

A.

Yes, talk to him.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

Because all the stuff that he was telling me

1

that hadn't been--

2

Q.

Are you talking about James Demita?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

So James was telling you things about the

5
6

project?
A.

He was going to these council meetings, and

7

he would come home and say, "Well, I can't believe how

8

fast they accepted all these things, and it's all

9

passed," and I went to Comstock and he said no, it

10

hadn't been passed by the city at all.

11

Q.

So you asked your daughter to talk to--

12

A

Talk to Comstock, yes.

13

Q

And that was just before you got this

14

letter?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

So before you learned that, you were still

17
18
19
20

moving ahead with James and-A.

Well, yes, I thought he was being truthful

with me.
Q.

The three of you were still trying to

21

develop the property to sell as late as April, and

22

maybe even as late as May of 1997?

23

A.

I didn't think it was that late.

24

Q.

Well, the letter is May 5, 1997?

25

A.

May 5th, yes.
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Q.

Then you got angry after you learned that

James wasn't telling you the truth, right?
A.

Yes, I was angry before, too.

Q.

But you were willing to continue developing

the property with him?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Then you went to see your lawyer after you

got this letter -- saw this letter?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's when you went to see him about

getting a divorce, right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's when you asked Phyllis to go over and

check on the records to see who owned the property; is
that right?
A.

No, I believe--

Q.

Mr. Patton asked that?

A.

Wasn't it that way?
MR. PATTON:

Counsel, do you want me to

testify?
MR. CHUNTZ: No, it's all right.
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Either you or Mr. Patton

asked your daughter to go check on the records about
the property?
A.

Get a deed for the property, yes, when she
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found out about that it had been done.
MR. CHUNTZ: We move to admit 15.
MR. PATT0N:

Your Honor, I want to make my

objection clear because I'm only objecting to the
admission of 15 if it's being admitted for the
purposes of what's stated in the letter, what's
stated in the letter is hearsay, and so therefore I'm
objecting to it being submitted for purposes of the
truthfulness of the letter.
However, if what he's submitting is to see
that my client was aware of the letter and had
received a copy of it, (inaudible) or at least seen a
copy, I'm not objecting to that.

But for purposes of

the truthfulness of the letter itself, we object.
MR. CHUNTZ:

I'm not offering it for the

subject matter of the letter.
THE COURT:

Okay, it will be received.

(Exhibit No. 15 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

During this whole period

when you and James and Andrea were working on
developing the property, you weren't contemplating
divorce then, were you?
A.

I really can't say.

Q.

You hadn't gone to see a lawyer about

getting a divorce, had you?
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A,

NO.

Q.

You were still working with Andrea and James

to get this property developed, weren't you?
A.

I must have.

Q.

That's what the documents seem to show,

don't they?
A.

Yes. But I could begin to see what a mess I

was getting in.
Q.

So you were beginning to see that you were

not going to be happy?
A.

Yes, I was beginning to see that it wasn't

his land, it was my land, I had to pay the consequence
of what I gave him to do, and I paid the consequences
of it.
Q.

So you weren't happy with the deal that you

entered into with him?
A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

You wanted to get out of that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you still weren't looking to divorce

Andrea at that point, were you?
A.

I don't know, there's been quite a few times

it's come up.
Q.

Now you've got other real property -- real

estate --in addition to the subject property here,

the marital home, don't you?

1
2

A.

The marital home?

3

Q.

Yeah, the place where you and Andrea lived.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

You have some property in a place called

6

Aspen Hills?

7

A.
there?

8

No.

No, I don't, no.

What made you think I have property up

That was dropped many years ago.

9

Q.

When was that dropped?

10

A.

I don't know, but I sold it -- I went up

11

there and had that stopped a long time ago.

12

I buy it?

13

Q.

When did

Well, I know you had it at least back in

14

1986, and in your answers to interrogatories back in

15

August of 1997, you listed real property in Indianola.
A.

16

No, that's not mine.

I don't have nothing

up there.

17
18

Q.

You don't have anything up there, either?

19

A.

No, I don't.

20

Q.

You did have property in Aspen Hills,

21

though?

22

A.

23
24
25

1

No.

I let that go a long time ago.

If I

still own it, it's never been paid for.
Q.

That would be a pretty good deal.

know if you own it or not.

I don't

A.

I don't own it.

Q.

In 1996 and in 1997 Andrea didn't owe you

any money, did she?
A.

No, I don't think so.

Q.

You've never claimed that she's owed you any

money, have you?
A.

No.

Q.

You weren't demanding or insisting that --

in 1996 you weren't demanding her or insisting that
she give you back the half of the property that you
had deeded over to her, were you?
A.

You mean the property that she owned?

Q.

No, I'm talking about the farm, the subject

property.

You weren't asking or demanding that she

give it back to you in 1996, were you?
A.

I could have been, yes.

Q.

You could have been?

A.

I wanted her to sign it back, I don't know

what year it was.
Q.

But you and she were trying to develop it in

A.

No, it wasn't then, it was before then.

Q.

You were aware in 1996 that if you died

1996?

before Andrea did, that she would get all of the
property and your kids wouldn't get any of it, weren't
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you?
A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

You weren't aware of that?

A.

No.

My understanding was that it would go

half.
Q.

You hadn't talked with anybody about what

joint tenancy meant?
A.

No.

Joint tenancy, that would mean both of

us, wouldn't it?
Q.

Did your daughter ever talk with you about

what would happen if you died, what would happen to
the property?
A.

No.

Q.

She never talked with you about it?

A.

My daughter?

Q.

Yes, your daughter, Phyllis.

A.

She might have, I don't remember.

Q.

You don't remember her ever talking with you

about getting the property taken out of joint tenancy
so that she could get half of the property?
A.

NO.

Q.

That wasn't a concern of yours?

A.

Well, no, I don't think it was, not right

then.

When was this?

Q.

1996.
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A

A.

I can't remember.

Q.

What do you remember about it?

A.

Talking to her about it, the property.

Q.

What do you remember about that?

Did you

ever have a concern that Andrea would get all of the
property if you died first?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

You never worried about that?

A.

Well, I signed it expecting that -- her name

on there expecting that she would only get half of it.
Q.

And that was your intention, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I want to take a look at part of Exhibit 3

with you, your financial declaration.
where I'm looking.

Let me show you

You've indicated here that your

gross income from your employment is $638, and that
your net income is $410; is that right?
A.

Yes, pretty close.

Q.

And the amount that--

A.

That's an average of the whole year.

Q.

And the average of the deductions that are

coming out are listed down here, $60 for federal and
state tax, right?
A.
out.

Just the state, the federal wasn't taken
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Q.

There was nothing taken out?

A.

Not at the school, no.

Q.

$35 per month for FICA, Social Security?

A.

Yes, they take that out automatically.

Q.

$8 per month for--

A.

This is medical insurance.

Q.

That's the $165.

A.

That's Geneva.

Q.

You're right.

And then you have this $105

that you've listed as a deduction, and that's
(inaudible)?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's a savings account, isn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You put that in every month?

A.

Yes, they take it out, yes.

Q.

And you're still taking that out every

month; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So really what comes out of this $638 every

month for taxes are the $103 that go to governments,
right, the $60, the $35 and the $8?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the rest just goes into an account --

the $105 goes into an account for you; is that

1

correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

It's $105 to (inaudible), that goes to you?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

So if we take that $103 for taxes off of the

6

$638, we' re left with $535 a month that you've got in

7

disposabl e income after taxes from your employment?

8

A.

Wait, now I don't understand.

9

Q-

Let me point it out.

10

A.

All of these are taken out in taxes from

11

there down to-Well, (inaudible) isn't a tax, is it?

12

Q<

13

A.

No, but there down to there.

14

Q.

And $165 for your medical insurance--

15

A.

That's Geneva.

16

Q.

That's for your medical, right?

17

A.

Medical, yes.

18

Q.

Taxes are $60, $35, and $8?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Unless counsel corrects me, I believe that
If you subtract $103 from the $638

21

adds up> to $103.

22

that silould be $535.

23
24
25

A.

No.

I'd be getting that much in cash?> I

don't cret that much.
Q.

I know you don't because you put $105 into
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(inaudible).
A.

(inaudible) yes.

Q.

So this was $535, and then you told us that

this is $329 for Geneva?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's because $165 comes off of this

$469, doesn't it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you get $769 from Social Security?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And my calculator tells me that those three

net amounts equal $633 as disposable income that you
have every month.

Does that seem right to you?

MR. PATT0N:

Your Honor, if I may interject,

I'm going to object just because of the nature of the
conversation.

I think we indicated in my client's

direct testimony sometimes he has trouble, I think he
explained why he had Phyllis trying to fill it out,
because we had trouble with this and some of those
numbers.
I don't dispute, counsel, that in closing
argument you can say "This number, if my addition is
correct--" I think what he's asking my client to do,
my client probably can't do without a calculator, and
just physically can't answer the questions.

I know
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where (inaudible) is going, he has a right to answer
it, the numbers are what they are, we don't dispute
that.

I think pursuing this is starting to reach the

point of harassment of my client simply because he
can't do the numbers in his head.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. CHUNTZ:

That's all the questions I

THE WITNESS:

Can I ask you a question?

have.

MR. CHUNTZ: Maybe after court is over, but
not at the present time.
THE COURT:

Mr. Patton, do you have any

further inquiry of your client?
MR. PATTON:

Yes, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PATTON:
Q.

Mr. Bradford, these documents, the contract

with Mr. Mullen, the working up, the LEI, the
surveyors, et cetera, did you do that or did Mr.
Demita do that?
A.

He hired it done, yes.

Q.

And these documents, did you prepare them or

did Mr. Demita prepare them?
A.

Jim.

Q.

And he brought them to you and had you sign

1
2
3
4

them?
A.

They billed -- whether they -- I got a note

from them or whether they told Andrea, and Andrea told
I me that this is what I owe them, I don't know.
Q.

6

And you were trying to say something about

I Mr. Demita would get a percentage of the property if

7

the property was actually sold or actually -- and you

8

got cut off.

9

would happen?

10

A.

What was your understanding of what

That I would owe him 25 percent --it says

11

on there on the document that I would owe him 25

12

percent of each lot; was that the way it read?

13

Q.

What was your understanding?

I'm not asking

14

you what it read, I'm asking what your understanding

15

of it was.

16

A.

That he would end up with a lot of money.

17

Q.

If it was developed?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Did you expect that he would get half the

20

property from Andrea and get an additional 25 percent?

21

A.

Yes, that's the way I figured it.

22

Q.

No, no, no.

23

I'm saying.

24

25 percent contract that you were trying to develop,

25

did you know that Andrea had already deeded over half

Mr. Bradford, listen to what

At any of the time that you signed that
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the property to him?
A.

Now when was this, what year?

Q.

1996.

Counsel asked you about trying to

develop the property in 1996 and early 1997. Do you
remember those conversations that he talked about?
A.

No, I don't really.

Q.

Do you remember counsel asking you about you

and Mr. Demita and Andrea trying to develop the
property from 1996 and in the first part of 1997?
A.

Yes.

Q.

During the period of time that you and Mr.

Demita and Andrea were trying to develop the property,
were you aware of the fact that Andrea had already
deeded one-half of the property to Mr. Demita?
A.

No.

Now this had happened -- when was this,

August of 1996 that this happened, that she had-Q.

Well, I can't answer those.

A.

Okay, but it was early--

Q.

When did you find out that Andrea had

deeded-A.

When she had gone to the county to get a

copy of the deed.
Q.

And who is "she" went to get a copy?

A.

That's Phyllis, my daughter.

Q.

So that would have been about the same time
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you saw the letter from Spanish Fork; is that; right?
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1

MR. PATTON:

2

w^th. that., your Honor, we would

rest

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CHUNTZ:

I call Andrea Bradford back

THE COURT:

I just remind you that you're

5
6

Mr. Chuntz?

d.
I

still under oath.
ANDREA BRADFORD
9

I

having been first duly sworn,

10

testifies as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
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13
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14
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pay, because it's under George's -- at that time I was
married to George, and he was billed for the bill.
Q.

And these debts are -- these doctors are

being patient with you?
A.

Pardon?

Q.

These doctors are being patient with you

right now?
A.

Yes, they are.

Q.

If you'll turn the page and look at No. 6

where it lists all of your expenses, you've had a
chance to review all of these expenses after we
prepared the document; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it would be your testimony that these

are the amounts that you are currently having to
spend, with exception of the rent money and utilities?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you're not paying any rent because

you're living in the marital home?
A.

That's right.

Q.

And you're not paying any utilities because

Mr. Bradford was ordered to pay the utilities?
A.

That's right.

Q.

So once this divorce is over and you're

living in your own place, or Mr. Bradford is no longer

1

living with you, you expect that you'll have to pay

2

utilities in the amount of $120 a month?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

So your monthly expenses without any rent --

5

paying any rent at all is still going to be $1150 per

6

month?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And you have available to you $3 72?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Are you requesting that Mr. Bradford

11

continue paying you alimony?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Are you requesting that that alimony be in

14

the amount of $600 per month?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

There's been testimony that Mr. Bradford

17

deeded over the marital residence joint tenancy

18

interest to you in 1989; is that correct?

19

A.

Yes, that's correct.

20

Q.

Did Mr. Bradford ever tell you why he did

22

A.

A few times.

23

Q.

What did he tell you?

24

A.

That I love you, that's why -- and I want to

21

25

this?

take care of you, I want you to have half.
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Q.

And you deeded your half of the property to

James in 1996?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You've heard testimony here today about the

bank accounts and retirement accounts and life
insurance cash values that are in George's name.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you asking for half of the value of all

of those assets?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

If the Court decides that your deeding the

property to James was okay, are you asking for any
portion of Mr. Bradford's half of the property?
A.

Absolutely no.

Q.

If the Court decides that you should not

have deeded the property to James, do you want the
Court to allow you to live in the home with your
grandson and James?
A.

Yes.

Q.

If the Court decides that you should not

have deeded the property to James, do you believe that
you should be entitled to your half of the property?
A.

Yes.
MR. CHUNTZ: That's all I have, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Anything further?
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MR. PATTON:

Yes, your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. PATTON:
Q.

Mrs. Bradford, if the Court decides that Mr.

Demita owns half the property --in other words he
owns half and George owns half, if I'm correct, you're
stating you agree that you don't own half of George's
half; is that right?

In other words, if it belongs to

Mr. Demita and Mr. Bradford, you don't own any portion
of Mr. Bradford's; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Do you own any part of Mr. Demita's if the

Court says that?
A.

We're family.

Q.

Which means what?

A.

That we take care of each other.

Q.

So if the Court were to give half of this

property -- determine that half of it belongs to Mr.
Demita, you believe that Mr. Demita would take care of
you?
A.

If I needed it, if I needed caring.

Q.

If the Court determined that Mr. Demita

could purchase Mr. Bradford's interest out of the
property, in other words he gets to purchase the
property from Mr. Bradford and not Mr. Bradford from
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Mr. Demita, would Mr. Demita continue to allow you to
live there?
A.

If I asked him, yes.

Q.

And if you continued to live there you

wouldn't: have the $600 a month rent or mortgage

|

payment , would you?
A.

No.

Q.

And on your financial declaration that you

listed what your income is, you didn't list the $150
that Mr . Demita gives you for child care, did you?
A.

It's not my child, though.

Q.

But wasn't your testimony this morning that

he pays you $150 a month to watch his child?
J

A .

And I use it on his child, but it has

nothing to do with my needs, though.

That's just a

child's needs being met, but my needs aren't met.
Q.

Can you tell the Court how long you've had

this carpal tunnel problem?
A.

The last two years I haven't had it because

I haven't gone to work because of that mostly.

I

didn't want to expound on it, you know, make it worse.
Q.

So you haven't done anything in the last two

years to make that worse?
A.
property.

Except for the work I did around the
I've hurt myself different times working on
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the property like a man.
Q.

But you were able to work around the

property like a man, then?
A.

Well, at my own pace.

At the factories they

make you keep up with an assembly line, and then that
aggravates the carpal tunnel where you can't stop and
rest it.

Days I didn't do things -- I didn't work

every day like a man at the property, just when my
health and strength would allow it.
Q.

Do you have problems focusing?

I mean there

was some comment about you had trouble focusing.

Do

you agree you have trouble focusing?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Andrea -- is it Andrea or Andrea?

A.

It doesn't matter.

Q.

If the Court concludes that Mr. Demita owns

half the property and that Mr. Bradford owns half the
property, he says that deed's valid, it's upheld, but
then he decides that-A.

Who's "he?"

Q.

The judge.

But then the judge decides or

rules that it was a dissipation, that you didn't have
any right to transfer the property away --in other
words what I'm saying is he says the deed is valid,
Mr. Demita owns the property or owns half of it, but
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then he rules "Mrs. Bradford, you didn't have any
right to transfer it, therefore you shouldn't have
done that, and you owe Mr. Bradford half the value of
that land," you would owe Mr. Bradford $60,000 or
$70,000 minimum, wouldn't you?
MR. CHUNTZ:

Objection, I think it's calling

for a legal conclusion.

He's giving argument and

asking her to-THE COURT:

Where are you headed with this,

MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, what I'm trying to

counsel?

establish is really that she doesn't have $60,000 or
$70,000 worth of assets to pay my client, and that's
clearly relevant because it goes to the issue of
solvency, and it's one of the possibilities that this
Court can issue a ruling on.
This Court can conclude that the deed is
valid, but it was a dissipation of assets, and as such
therefore she has to pay that back to the marital
estate, and at even the lowest figure I can come up
with, taking out costs of sale, taking out having to
repair the tanks, et cetera, she would still owe the
marital estate $60,000 to $70,000.

If you want me to

ask it that way, I'll withdraw that question and say,
"Do you have $60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets you
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could pay the marital estate?"
MR. CHUNTZ: And I would say asked and
answered.

If that's the question and that's where

he's going with it, he put her through that whole
rigamorole on direct examination when he had her up on
the stand, and asked about every piece of property she
had and how much value it was and --he already knows
the answer.
MR. PATTON:

Are you stipulating she

doesn'1?
THE COURT:
Q.

Overruled, go ahead.

BY MR. PATTON:

Andrea Bradford, do you have

$60,000 or $70,000 worth of assets that you could pay
back to the marital estate if that's what the Court
orders you to do?
A.

Personally, no, but I possibly -- definitely

could get it.
Q.

From where?

A.

That is my business.
MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, I'm going to ask

you that you instruct her to answer.
THE COURT:

Please answer the question,

ma'am.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

I have family.
So you would get that money
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from the family?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you don't personally have those assets?

A.

No.
MR. PATTON:

No further questions.

THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. CHUNTZ: Nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. CHUNTZ: Your Honor, could we have a
five minute recess?

I want to call Mr. Demita, but he

needs to call his son.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

(Short recess taken)
THE COURT:

Come forward and be sworn.

COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
JAMES DEMITA
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHUNTZ:
Q.

Please state your name for the record.
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A

James A. Demita.

Q.

And where do you reside?

A.

1100 South Main in Spanish Fork.

Q.

Who do you reside there with?

A.

My mother and step-father and my son.

Q.

You've heard testimony that your mother

deeded you by quit claim deed all of her interest in
the property where you reside; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And that was in August of 1996?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were you involved -- did you discuss this

transfer of the property with your mother prior to its
being deeded?
A.

Yes, most of the discussion was with you and

my mother, but I discussed it with her as well.
Q.

Did you have a concern about what would

happen to her share of the property if she died before
Mr. Bradford?
A.

Yes, actually both sides of that coin

because my mother didn't necessarily know if it was
great to -- if Mr. Bradford were to die first then she
would get it all, and she thought it would be more
fair just to make sure both sides got half with how it
stood, you know, Mr. Bradford got half, she got half,
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so she just wanted to make sure that both sides of the
family got their half instead of one getting it all
and the other nothing.
Q.

You heard my questions and Mr. Bradford's

answers about developing the subject property.
A.

Yes.

Q.

How long had he and you been talking about

doing that, say before August of 1996?
A.

How many months before?

Q.

Yes.

A.

We initially started in approximately

December of 1995, late December of 1995.
Q.

And then you went through assisting in

getting these contracts drawn up and entered into?
A.

Well, I didn't draw the contracts up, I

called around and tried to find people (inaudible)
selling the land to be developed, I contacted
different developers and saw if any of them would be
interested in purchasing it, and then Mr. Mullen and
Mr. Gardner had their attorney, I'm assuming -actually Mr. Mullen's an attorney, from what I
understand.
Anyway, they provided the documents and then
I had a friend that used an attorney up at Snow,
Christensen, and Martineau in Salt Lake and he agreed
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to look over the documents just in George and my
mother's behalf, just to see if there was any problem
with it or whatever, and he said they looked fine, so
then they signed them.
Q.

As the property now exists, can it be

divided into two equal parts in a partition?
A.

I don't think so.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Well, it's unique, it's got the river on one

side and then you've got city ground on the other and
then you have the house, so I don't really know how
you could do it equitably, especially with the house
on it.
Q.

Are you asking the Court to award the

property be sold pursuant to the partition statute?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you willing to buy Mr. Bradford's share

of the property for half of its appraised value?
A.

Yes.
MR. CHUNTZ:

That's all the questions I

have.
Q.
question.

BY MR. CHUNTZ:

Let me ask you another

If the property was placed on the market

pursuant to the partition statute, would you be
willing to take half of the higher amount if it would
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sell for more than the appraised value?
A.

Why don't you just say that one more time.

Q.

If the property was put up for sale pursuant

to the statute, and a buyer was willing to pay more
than what it's been appraised for, would you be
satisfied in taking your half?
A.

Sure.

I'd prefer to keep it, obviously,

because my son has been living there and I've been
living there and my mom lives there.
Q.

So if somebody was willing to offer more

than $180,000 for the property, would you be willing
to try to match that offer?
A.

Yeah, I would try to do that because like I

said, I would like to keep my son -- you know, we've
been living there for awhile now and just keep things
stable.
MR. CHUNTZ:

Thank you.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. PATTON:
Q.

Mr. Demita, you're indicating that you would

like to do that and buy my client out.

Where are you

employed?
A.

Pardon me?

Q.

Where are you employed?

A.

Well, I do independent consulting for a
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computer store here in town.

I'm working with other

developers right now since I gained experience in
developing land, and working with different projects
in the valley right now, then I do a public community
service, I write a column in the - - a weekly column in
the newspaper.
Q.

And from all these different things that you

do, how much money did you earn last year?
A.

Well, last year I was developing with Mr.

Bradford so I didn't earn very much.
Q.

How much did you earn?

A

Less than $3,500.

Q

So all of last year you earned less than

$3,500?
A

Yes and no.

Q

How much did you earn in the tax year 1996?

A

I'm sorry, I thought you said 1996.

said 1995?
Q.

No, last year was 1997.

A.

Right, so what are you asking?

Q.

Last year was 1997.

A.

Right.

Q.

How much did you earn in 1997?

A.

Less than $3,500.

Q.

How much did you earn in 1996?

You
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A.

I was working on land still, so it was less

than $3,500.
Q.

And how much in 1995?

A.

Well, I was in school.

Q.

Which law school was it?

A.

In Oregon.

Q.

What was the name of the law school?

A.

Will (inaudible).

Q.

When this development discussion was going

on, I believe your testimony was you were the one who
was talking with the attorneys?
A.

I don't know what you mean by talking to the

attorneys.

Mr. Mullen is an attorney, one of the

developers, and I spoke with him, yes.
Q.

I believe you spoke with somebody at

Martineau in Salt Lake?
A.

Yes, some firm up in Salt Lake. My buddy

that I met in law school said his family uses this guy
and he would be willing to take a look at it for free
and see how it looked, so I asked Mr. Bradford -well, actually he didn't say free, he said a small
fee, whatever his hourly fee is.

So then I told Mr.

Bradford and my mother and they said, "Yeah, go ahead
and have him look at it." When I got up there he
didn't charge, he just said, "It looks fine," and he
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didn't charge.
Q.

So when you were going to do that you

discussed that with your mother and Mr. Bradford?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Because they were involved with it and you

wanted to be fair with them; is that right?
A.

Well, I just told them everything that was

going on.
Q.

So you tried to be sure that they knew

everything that was going on?
A.

At that point yes, definitely.

Q.

Are you the individual who prepared the quit

claim deed that was signed by Andrea Bradford?
A.

I'm not sure if you mean prepared, I signed

in the part where it was $10 -- the handwritten part I
did.

I didn't notarize it or I didn't sign her

signature or anything.

I just did the handwritten

part that you can see on there.
MR. PATTON:
THE COURT:
Q.

May I approach the witness?
You may.

BY MR. PATTON:

I'm going to show you my

copy of Exhibit 1.
A.

Okay.

Q.

I'm going to show you what's been marked

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for identification and ask
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you if you recognize that.
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

I'm going to ask you to take this yellow

highlighter and I want you to highlight-THE COURT:

Plaintiff's 16, this is

Plaintiff's 1.
MR. PATTON:

Well, we're making a new--

THE WITNESS:
so you know.

This says Plaintiff's 1, just

I'm sorry, I thought you were saying P-l

here (inaudible) 16, sorry.
THE COURT:

Do you want to take this one?

MR. PATTON:

We have another copy -- no,

we're not using Plaintiff's l, we're now using
Plaintiff's 16.
THE COURT:

What's the difference?

MR. PATTON:

(inaudible) mark it.

THE COURT:

Make sure that' s - -

COURT CLERK :

I think we're using

(inaudible).
MR. PATTON:

Yes, we are, this is the new

one.
THE COURT:
MR. PATTON:
THE COURT:
of the same deed?

Right, so that one-That's 1.
You lost me, why do we have two

Ill

MR. PATTON:

Because this one will be

different in just a second.

This one will look

different than that one in just a second.

That's the

one I'm going to have him mark.
MR. CHUNTZ:

If he's going to mark it I

suppose it's okay.
THE COURT:
Q.

Go ahead.

BY MR. PATTON:

Will you highlight in yellow

those portions that you printed in that document?
A.

Sure.

(Witness marks document)
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

So those portions you've

highlighted on Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 for
identification are the portions that you wrote in?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now the legal description of the property,

although it's typed, it actually looks like it's been
xeroxed on there; is that correct?
A.

I believe so.

The actual -- LEI, I think,

is the one that provided the document.
Q.

LEI provided this document?

A.

Yeah, because they had it on file, so they

said -- I don't know if they copied it or what they
did to it, but they said, "Here's the document," and
then I hand wrote the part you see that's in

1

handwriting, and then we went to the bank and an

2

individual at Zion's Bank notarized it.

3

Q.

When you say "we" you mean you and your mom?

4

A.

Yes.

5

MR. PATTON:

Your Honor, we would submit

6

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16 as Plaintiff's Exhibit No.

7

16.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CHUNTZ:

10
11
12

THE COURT:

Any objection?
No objection.
Sixteen will be received.

(Exhibit No. 16 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. PATTON:

I'm curious, Mr. Demita, if

13

you had the document and you talked with Mr. Chuntz

14

with your mom, or if you spoke with Mr. Chuntz and

15

then you went and got the document, the quit claim

16

deed, which occurred first?

17

A.

I didn't get the quit claim deed for some

18

time after they discussed different options that she

19

had before her.

20
21

Q.

My question is what was that some time, a

week, two weeks?

22

A.

No, it was a few months.

23

Q.

A few months?

24

A.

Yeah, a few months.

25

Q.

So when she spoke to Mr. Chuntz about her
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options on estate planning, that was several months
before August?
A.

Well, I didn't say several, I said a few.

Q.

So it was a few months before August?

A.

It was in about April, I believe.

Q.

So that was in about April, and the quit

claim deed was signed in August?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What was the urgency to sign the quit claim

deed in August if you had known about it since April?
A.

There is no urgency.

Q.

Was there any particular reason it wasn't

typed, and it was handwritten instead of being typed?
A.

I didn't have a typewriter.

Q.

In August when the quit claim deed was

prepared, how long after you got it from these people
that you said had it and it was signed?
A.

Not too long, I can't remember exactly.

Q.

A day, a week?

A.

It was probably in the duration of a week or

less.
Q.

My question is it's been since April, you

get this document evidently right at the end of July
or the first part of August, was there any
conversations between you and your mom at or about
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that time as to why it had to be done then and not
later or not earlier?
A.

Like I said, I don't know what you mean by

"had to be done."
have to be done.

We never --it didn't necessarily
That was just part of what she was

discussing, and they said you can do a trust or you
can quit claim it, and it's quicker, you don't have to
have all the added fees and all that other stuff, and
so there's no particular magical number about that
date.

That's just when it got signed.

Q.

The quit claim deed, the talking with the

attorneys, the talking with LEI, et cetera, the reason
that was done -- and I don't want to be rude to your
mom and I don't want to be rude to Mr. Bradford, but
it's fair for me to assume that they're not very
sophisticated people in terms of those type of
business dealings; isn't that true?
A.

I can't make a characterization like that.

Q.

Is it fair to say that you're more

sophisticated than they are?
A.

I'm not going to say I'm better than

somebody, okay?

I'm not going to say I'm more

sophisticated or I'm smarter than somebody else. I
think everybody has a relative range of normality.
Q.

You have graduated from college?
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A.

Yes. That doesn't mean you're smarter.

Q.

I agree. And I don't know if you finished

law school, but you at least had some training at law
school?
A.

Sure.

Q.

I believe your previous testimony was when

you were dealing with Mr. Bradford and your mom and
doing these types of things, you were trying to be as
open and honest with them as you could and keep them
informed?
A.

Yes, absolutely.

Q.

But you didn't inform Mr. Bradford that she

had signed that quit claim deed, did you?
A.

We discussed it the whole time.

I mean we

knew right when we went in, we said, "Okay, we're
going to develop the property, where's the money going
to go when they get the money?" And they said, "Well,
it's only fair half goes to his side and half goes to
the other."
Q.

My question is when the quit claim deed was

signed did you tell Mr. Bradford it had been signed?
A.

Not in so many words, no.
MR. PATTON:

Thank you.

(End of partial transcript)

116

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)
)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed
under my direction from the electronic tape recording
made of these proceedings.
That this transcript is full, true, and correct
and contains all of the evidence, all of the
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all
matters to which the same relate which were audible
through said tape recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the
speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 8th day of
December 1998.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2000

-~")

/Q/V/// /Y
NOTXKV'PUBLIC
residing in Utah County

iif

%

6EVSRLY A. LOWE

\ v X f - '>"V C n E f ' J7AM £4050
' < £ { > • C0MM. EXP. 2-24-00

!

c i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of December, 1999, a true
and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited in the
United States mail to:
HOWARD CHUNTZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1149 W CENTER ST
OREM UT 84057
THOMAS R. PATTON
ALDRICH NELSON WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 E 200 N
PO BOX "L"
PROVO UT 84 603
and a true and correct copy of the attached OPINION *as deposited
in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT
125 N 100 W
PO BOX 1847
PROVO UT 84 603

<r\c(.Cu QJ&4.y,j>
Judicial Secretary'

,/

TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, 974401237
APPEALS CASE NO.: 981745-CA

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 1 6 1999
COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

George R. Bradford,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

Case No. 981745-CA
F I L E D
(December 16, 1999)

Andrea O. Bradford and
James A. Demita,

, 1999 UT App 373 ,

Defendants and Appellants

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Steven L. Hansen
Attorneys:

Howard Chuntz, Orem, for Appellants
Thomas R. Patton, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Billings.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
Hi
Mr. George K. Bradford filed for divorce from his wife, Mrs.
Andrea O. Bradford, on June 10, 1997. In the same complaint, he
alleged Mrs. Bradford had fraudulently conveyed a property
interest in the couple's home to her son, Mr. James A. Demita, a
named defendant. This appeal thus arises from two related cases
tried together by agreement of the parties and the trial court.
Mrs. Bradford appeals che trial court's order setting aside her
conveyance of her interest in the home to Mr. Demita and the
trial court's order awarding the home entirely to Mr. Bradford.
We affirm the order setting aside the conveyance, but reverse the
award of the home to Mr. Bradford and remand for further
proceedings regarding property division between Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford.
RELEVANT FACTS
1|2
The Bradfords were married in June 1985. Each had been
married once before, and each had at least one child from the
prior marriage. No children were born of their marriage to each
other.

^3
During their marriage, the couple lived in Mr. Bradford's
home located in Spanish Fork, Utah. Mr. Bradford was raised in
this home, which his grandfather and father both owned before
him. Before marrying Mrs. Bradford, he received title to the
home from his father as a gift. Several improvements were made
to the home during the couple's marriage, including a repaired
roof and septic system, the addition of a new furnace, and
plumbing work connecting the home to the city's water supply.
Mr. Bradford paid for these improvements with funds he received
before the marriage as part of a settlement with Geneva Steel.
Mrs. Bradford's only contribution to the improvements consisted
of making phone calls and arranging for the work to be done. The
undisputed present estimated value of the home is $180,000.
1)4
In 1989, approximately four years after they married, Mr.
Bradford transferred the home by way of warranty deed to himself
and his wife as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship
and not as tenants in common." Three years later, however, Mr.
Bradford filed for divorce and asked that the home and real
property be awarded to him. That action was dismissed in 1993
after the parties reunited.
H5
The couple continued to have marital difficulties, and Mr.
Bradford threatened divorce many times. Nevertheless, in 1996,
the couple engaged in a joint business venture with Mrs.
Bradford's son, Mr. Demita, to develop property, upon which the
home was located. Mr. Demita was to receive twenty-five percent
of the profits for his assistance in developing the property. At
the time of this business arrangement, Mr. Demita was living with
the Bradfords and had done so rent-free since December 1995.
1J6
In July 1996, shortly after the property venture began, Mr.
Bradford arrived home to find several engineers in the house. He
was upset with the slow progress of the project and had an
argument with Mrs. Bradford. This time, the argument was severe,
and the couple again discussed divorce.
%7
On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford transferred her interest in
the home by way of quit claim deed to her son, Mr. Demita. She
later claimed this transfer was for "estate planning purposes."
Mr. Demita gave Mrs. Bradford $10 as consideration for the
property transfer. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita told Mr.
Bradford about this transaction, and Mrs. Bradford continued to
live in the home. Mr. Bradford discovered the existence of the
quit claim deed several months later when his daughter went to
the County Recorder's Office to verify Mr. Demita*s
representations that the home and property had been rezoned for
development. She found the quit claim deed and discovered the
property, in fact, had not been rezoned.

^8
On June 10, 1997, soon after he learned about the deed to
Mr. Demita, Mr. Bradford filed a complaint for divorce against
Mrs. Bradford and included Mr. Demita as a party to the action.
After a bench trial, the court awarded Mr. Bradford a divorce.
The trial court also found that the transfer between Mrs.
Bradford and Mr. Demita was fraudulent and set aside the
conveyance. In awarding the subject property, the trial court
concluded the house and real property were not partitionable and
would have to be refinanced or sold if awarded to both Mr.
Bradford and Mrs. Bradford. The court thus awarded the home and
the real property to Mr. Bradford. In addition, the court
awarded Mrs. Bradford alimony in the amount of $600 a month and
divided equally the remaining marital property, including bank
accounts, an IRA account, retirement funds, and the cash value of
an insurance policy.
%9
Mrs. Bradford moved the trial court to amend its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, but the court denied her motion.
Mrs. Bradford and her son then filed this appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
^|10 This case involves three critical issues. First, did Mrs.
Bradford's conveyance of her joint tenancy interest in the home
constitute a fraudulent transfer? Because this issue involves
both questions of law and of fact, we review the trial court's
findings of fact for clear error. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d
1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). "In contrast, we review a trial court's
conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set of found facts
for correctness." Id. {citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994)). Nevertheless, "[w]e may still grant the trial
court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact
situation." Id.
^11 Second, if the transfer was fraudulent, and therefore void,
was the nature of the property marital or separate? This issue
primarily presents a question of law; therefore, we review the
trial court's legal conclusions concerning the nature of property
for correctness. See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 836
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (considering whether 401(k) plan is marital
property).
Hl2 Third, did the trial court properly award the subject
property entirely to Mr. Bradford? In deciding this question, we
acknowledge that "[t]rial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases,
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

ANALYSIS
I.

Fraudulent Conveyance

1|l3 We first address the fraudulent conveyance issue. The trial
court concluded the transfer was fraudulent under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13
(1998) , and declared the transfer void.
1|l4 A fraudulent transfer in Utah first requires a creditordebtor relationship. Essentially, a fraudulent transfer occurs
when a debtor transfers substantially all his or her assets to
another to defraud a creditor or avoid a debt. A "creditor,"
according to section 25-6-2(4), "means a person who has a claim."
A "'claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3) (1998)
(emphasis added); see also Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 206, 48
P.2d 513, 516 (1935) (holding persons having tort claim against
grantor that was not reduced to judgment at time of conveyance
are "creditors").
1115 Although no Utah cases directly address whether a husband or
wife becomes a creditor of his or her spouse when contemplating
divorce, the Oregon Supreme Court's statement on the subject is
helpful to our analysis:
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Or. 385, 388-89, 15
P. 650, 2 Am. St. Rep. 162 (1887), we held
that a person in the position of plaintiff
may maintain a suit to set aside a
transaction which may defeat her recovery and
rights in a contemplated suit for divorce.
This rule prevails in other jurisdictions
that have considered the matter.
We conclude, as did the trial court,
that the conveyance by deed of April 14,
1972, was obtained by fraud to hinder or
prevent plaintiff's recovery of [defendant's]
equitable interest in the fourplex, in the
divorce suit, and is therefore set aside and
held to be void.
Adamson v. Adamson, 541 P.2d 460, 466 (Or. 1975) (citations
omitted).
1|l6 In this case, the trial court determined that " [p] ursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4) and § 25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a
creditor of Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real
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property which Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. Demita."
The trial court based this conclusion on the fact that Mr.
Bradford had threatened divorce just weeks before Mrs. Bradford
made the transfer. That conclusion is consistent with the Oregon
Supreme Court's analysis in Adamson, which we adopt. In our
view, the trial court correctly concluded Mr. Bradford was,
indeed, a creditor of Mrs. Bradford, given that his claim to the
house--although not reduced to judgment in a divorce proceeding-had arisen through recent threats of divorce. We note this
conclusion is consistent with our supreme court's admonition to
construe the statute liberally "to reach all artifices and
evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect."
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987); see also
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 291, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (1960)
("'[A]11 statutes made against fraud should be liberally and
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud.'") (quoting Twyne's
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)).
\\1
Having concluded Mr. Bradford is a creditor of Mrs.
Bradford, we next examine whether Mrs. Bradford made a fraudulent
transfer of her joint tenancy interest to her son. According to
Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act, "A transfer made . . . by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's
claim arose before or after the transfer was made . . . , if the
debtor made the transfer . . . (a) with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. §
25-6-5(1) (1998).
1[l8 A creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with
actual intent to defraud under section 25-6-5(1) (a) must
establish that claim by clear and convincing evidence. See
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Nevertheless, " [f]raudulent intent is ordinarily
considered a question of fact, and 'may be inferred from the
presence of certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."1" Id.
at 462 (quoting Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 423
(Utah 1986)) (other citations and footnotes omitted). Utah's
statute codifies those factors historically considered by the
common law as indicia or badges of fraud in section 25-6-5(2),
which states:
To determine "actual intent" under Subsection
(1)(a), consideration may be given, among
other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an
insider; m
1.

The relevant portion of the Act includes in its definition of
(continued...)

(b) the debtor retained possession or control
of the property transferred after the
transfer;

(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed
or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or
obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;

(e) the transfer was of substantially all the
debtor's assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received
by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to
the value of the asset transferred . . . .
See also Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 553, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056
(1932) (holding conveyances between near relatives, calculated to
prevent creditor from realizing on claim, are subject to rigid
scrutiny); Givan, 351 P.2d at 962 (holding transactions among
close relatives receive close scrutiny but close relationship
does not necessarily mean transaction is invalid).
Hl9 The trial court used these factors in concluding Mrs.
Bradford had actual intent to defraud Mr. Bradford.
Specifically, the trial court found "that the transfer was
concealed from Mr. Bradford, Mrs. Bradford continues to live in
the house as before, Mr. Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford
with divorce a matter of weeks before the transfer, and the
transfer was substantially all of the assets that Mrs. Bradford
believed that she had."
1)20 We, too, conclude these badges of fraud are adequate to show
actual intent by Mrs. Bradford to fraudulently convey her
interest to her son. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
findings (including those denominated as conclusions) that the
transfer was fraudulent and void. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-68(1) (a) (1998) .
II.

Nature of Property

1121 Our conclusion that the transfer is void necessarily
restores the joint tenancy title to the home in Mr. and Mrs.
Bradford. Nevertheless, Mr. Bradford argues the property should
be treated as separate property because he inherited it, brought
it into the marriage, and maintained and improved it. The trial
(...continued)
an "insider" a person who is "a relative of the debtor."
Code Ann. § 25-6-2(7) (a) (i) (1998) .
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court, he contends, was therefore correct in awarding the subject
property to him despite its joint tenancy status.
K22 Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her
interest in separately acquired property into the marital estate.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-3 (1998). A transfer of otherwise
separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is
generally presumed to be a gift, see 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §
103(a), at 397 (1991) (citing Kramer v. Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157,
159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)), and, when coupled with an evident
intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that property
to marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
307-08 (Utah 1988); see also Bonne11 v. Bonnell. 344 N.W.2d 123,
126 (Wis. 1984) (stating spouse may transfer separate property
into marital estate and "separate property transferred into joint
tenancy becomes part of the marital estate"); cf. Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (finding trial court did
not abuse discretion in awarding home held in joint tenancy to
wife when "there was no intention by [wife] to create a one-half
property interest in [husband], nor any expectation by [husband]
that he had received a one-half property interest").
1|23 In Mortensen, our supreme court considered how property
inherited during a marriage should be divided upon divorce.
After examining the law in other jurisdictions, the court
announced that, as a general rule, "property acquired by one
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage [should be
awarded] to that spouse, together with any appreciation or
enhancement of its value." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 ;2 see also
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
("[E]quity [generally] requires that each party retain the
separate property he or she brought into the marriage."). This
rule applies
unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her
efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, . . . or (2) the property has
been consumed or its identity lost through
2. Although the subject property in Mortensen was inherited
during the couple's marriage, subsequent courts have applied the
Mortensen ruling to property inherited before marriage. See,
e.g., Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) ("f"[E]ach party should, in general, receive the real and
personal property he or she brought to the marriage or inherited
during the marriage."1" (Quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 306.)
(Alteration in original.) (Other citations omitted.)).

commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 380 (emphasis in original).
1|24 In this case, the record is clear, and the trial court
found, that Mr. Bradford conveyed his interest in the home to
himself and his wife as "joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship and not as tenants in common." According to the
trial testimony, Mr. Bradford intended at that time to give a
one-half interest in the home to his wife.3 Nothing in the trial
court's findings or the record indicates otherwise. We therefore
conclude the transfer of Mr. Bradford's separate property to his
wife as a joint tenant with himself effectively transformed the
subject property from Mr. Bradford's separate property into
marital property.
III.

Property Award

1125 Our determination regarding the property's nature does not
end our inquiry, for we must also decide whether the trial court
properly awarded the home, even though marital property, entirely
to Mr. Bradford.
"We afford the trial court 'considerable
latitude in adjusting financial and property
interests, and its actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity.' Accordingly,
changes will be made in a trial court's
property division determination in a divorce
action 'only if there was a misunderstanding
or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderated against the
3.

Mr. Bradford testified as follows:
Q:
What do you remember about [your
discussion with your daughter concerning
the joint tenancy]? Did you ever have a
concern that [Mrs. Bradford] would get
all of the property if you died first?
A:
No, I didn't.
Q:
You never worried about that?
A:
Well, I signed it expecting that--her
name on there expecting that she would
only get half of it.
Q:
And that was your intention, wasn't it?
A:
Yes.

Q

findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.f"
Thomas v. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992) (quoting
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988))).
1)26 Generally, in a divorce proceeding " [e] ach party is presumed
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty
percent of the marital property." Id. (alteration in original)
(citations and additional quotation marks omitted). This
presumptive rule of thumb, however, does not supersede the trial
court's broad equitable power to distribute marital property,
regardless of who holds title. See Finlayson. 874 P.2d at 849
("'Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that
once a court has determined something is marital property, the
court may distribute it equitably, notwithstanding which party's
name appears on the title.'" (Citation omitted.)); Haumont, 793
P.2d at 424 n.l ("[T]he trial court may, in the exercise of its
broad discretion, divide the property equitably, regardless of
its source or time of acquisition."); Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146
("There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of
properties in a divorce action."). A trial court may elect to
distribute marital property unequally when the circumstances and
needs of the parties dictate a departure from the general rule
(e.g., to enable one party to fulfill an alimony or child support
obligation). See Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; see also
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) (holding trial
courts should be guided by general purpose of property division,
"which is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves
the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their
separate lives"); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.l
(Utah 1987) ("In determining whether a certain division of
property is equitable, . . . the relative abilities of the
spouses to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to
an equitable . . . division of the fixed assets of the
marriage."); Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262, 1269-70 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (affirming award to husband of marital home previously
owned by husband but conveyed to wife in joint tenancy just
before marriage; trial court found marriage was of short
duration, no children were born, and couple married later in
life).
%21 An unequal division of marital property, however, is only
justified when the trial court "memorialize[s] in commendably
detailed findings" the exceptional circumstances supporting the
distribution. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; see also
Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425 (holding property division must be
supported by adequate factual findings). In this case, the trial
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court's only finding justifying the award of the home to Mr,
Bradford was that "the house and property is in fact not
partitionable as it contains a residence, road and river
frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would
have to be refinanced or sold."4 This finding is insufficient,
by itself, to support an award of the marital home entirely to
Mr. Bradford. Trial courts often order a sale of marital
property and equitably divide the proceeds between the parties.
See, e.g., Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). A
trial court may also allow one spouse to "buy out" the other
spouse's interest in marital property. See, e.g., id.
The
trial court made no adequate finding explaining why either of
these two remedies was not appropriate for the parties in this
case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's award of the
marital home solely to Mr. Bradford.
i|28 Nevertheless, our role is not to supplant the trial court's
function in making a property distribution; the trial court is in
a much better position to determine a proper remedy. Moreover,
an award of the subject property in this case has an integral
relationship to the trial court's other orders concerning alimony
and other property. We therefore remand this case to the trial
court to determine these matters in light of our conclusion that
the subject property is marital, not separate, property.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge
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WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Qid^l &>• BU&*4<)
Judge7-

C^udith M. B i l l i n g s ,

4. We note, also, that the parties at one time, at least,
contemplated development and sale of the property and had
enlisted Mr. Demita's assistance in doing so.
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George R. Bradford,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 981745-CA

v.
Andrea 0. Bradford and
James A. Demita,
Defendant and Appellant

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon petitioners' motion
filed on January 18, 2000, for a thirty (30)-day enlargement of
time to file a petition for writ of certiorari.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for enlargement of time
to file a petition for writ of certiorari is granted pursuant to
Rule 48(e) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The petition
for writ of certiorari is due to be filed with the Utah Supreme
Court on or before February 16, 2000.

For The Court:

Date

c^.0; 2^)06
Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court
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